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Articles
Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade
of Parallel Proceedings and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Transnational Litigation
Louise Ellen Teitz*
[A] rule which permitted parallel proceedings would avoid
a "race to file" but in its place would be an equally trou-
bling "race to judgment". If neither action is stayed, the
advantage goes to the first party to obtain judgment in its
favour because the other jurisdiction would be expected to
respect that judgment. Permitting parallel proceedings to
continue would encourage a litigation strategy in which
each side would attempt to expedite its own action while
prolonging in any way possible the other party 's action
through endless motions or other delaying tactics. In other
words, allowing parallel proceedings to continue would
not avoid entirely the problem of a "race to the courthouse"
but would simply push the problem back a stage in the
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proceedings.1
It seems to me that in this day of exceedingly high costs of
litigation, where no comity principles between nations are
at stake in resolving a piece of commercial litigation,
courts have an affirmative duty to prevent a litigant from
hopping halfway around the world to a foreign court as a
means of confusing, obfuscating and complicating litiga-
tion already pending for trial in a court in this country.2
Just over ten years ago, a new undertaking in private inter-
national law was being inaugurated at the Hague in the form of a
treaty on the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law (Hague Conference), an in-
ter-governmental organization composed of over 50 countries.3 In
an attempt to gain greater respect for U.S. judgments abroad, es-
pecially in an era of increasing international trade and commerce,
the United States government in 1992-93 encouraged the Hague
Conference to negotiate a multilateral convention on foreign
judgments. In this article I consider the problems of concurrent
proceedings in multiple countries over the last decade in the con-
text of the complementary developments in the enforcement of
foreign judgments during the same period. While multiple pro-
ceedings and enforcement of judgments have taken independent
journeys, both have traveled toward a convergence which at-
tempts to harmonize problems of multiple proceedings within the
context of enforcing judgments. 4
I. INTRODUCTION
As the world has become smaller, the number of parallel pro-
1. Westec Aerospace Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., [1999] 67 B.C.L.R. 3d
278, 289 (B.C. Ct. App. 1999) (Rowles, J.A.).
2. China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 40 (2d
Cir. 1987) (Bright, J., dissenting).
3. The Hague Conference on Private International Law (Hague Confer-
ence) is devoted to harmonizing private international law and working to-
wards concluding international treaties in this area. See infra Part VII.A-B.
4. This conjunction of parallel proceedings and enforcement of judg-
ments is seen in attempts to harmonize concepts of lis pendens on one hand,
and forum non conveniens, or declining jurisdiction, on the other. See gener-
ally DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (J.J. Fawcett ed.,
1995).
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ceedings has been expanding. Increasing globalization of trade has
both multiplied the number of parallel proceedings and the num-
ber of countries whose courts are facing the challenge of concur-
rent jurisdiction.5 The proliferation of multiple proceedings has
led to a variety of approaches, 6 especially in U.S. courts, which re-
flect the doctrinal inconsistencies in analyzing multiple proceed-
ings, often with tools developed for purely domestic use.7 Thus one
finds analogies to state-state, state-federal, and federal-federal
models. These divergent methods highlight the increasing need for
U.S. courts to adopt a uniform response to parallel proceedings in-
volving a foreign forum.
During the last decade, the problems of parallel proceedings
and related issues have gained increasing attention within the
context of transnational litigation and dispute resolution. The at-
tempts to negotiate a worldwide convention on jurisdiction and en-
forcement of foreign judgments at the Hague8 have highlighted
this dilemma, as discussed below. Similarly, attempts to rational-
ize and federalize enforcement of foreign judgments within the
5. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
6. See LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 233-50 (1996 &
Supp. 1999) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION]; Louise Ellen Teitz,
Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of Juris-
diction and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAW. 21, 28-48 (1992) [hereinafter
Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites].
7. For a discussion of the incorrect reliance on domestic precedent in an
international context, see Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222-24
(11th Cir. 1999), discussed in Louise Ellen Teitz, International Litigation;
Parallel Proceedings and the Guiding Hand of Comity, 34 INT'L LAW. 545,
546-47 (2000).
8. There is extensive literature on the Hague jurisdiction and judg-
ments negotiations and drafts. See generally SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE
PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (2003); LAW AND
JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN
(James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002)[hereinafter LAw
AND JUSTICE]; Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague
Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89 (1999); Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Ju-
risdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments
Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319 (2002); Arthur T. von Me-
hren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections of the Design of Recognition
Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17 (1998) [hereinafter von Mehren, Enforc-
ing Judgments Abroad]; Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994) [hereinafter von Mehren, Recognition and En-
forcement].
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United States, particularly those by the American Law Institute
(ALI),9 have had to address the issue of parallel proceedings. 10
Meanwhile across the Atlantic, the problem of parallel proceed-
ings within the context of internal judicial integration under the
Brussels Convention" and now the Brussels Regulation 12 has
reached the European Court of Justice which has been attempting
to reconcile European law with the national law of common-law
jurisdictions that include the doctrines of antisuit injunctions and
discretionary dismissals. 13 Even if there is currently no harmoni-
9. See INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Tentative
Draft No 2, 2004) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
PROJECT]. Professors Lowenfeld and Silberman, both from the NYU School of
Law, are the reporters. See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A
Different Challenge for the ALL: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an In-
ternational Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635 (2000).
10. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 9,
at § 11. The ALI draft statute specifically acknowledges the connection be-
tween parallel proceedings and forum non conveniens, being entitled "Decli-
nation of Jurisdiction When Prior Action Is Pending." See discussion infra
Part VII.C.
11. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2 [hereinaf-
ter Brussels Convention].
12. The Brussels Convention was replaced by EU Regulation 44/2001 on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Mar. 1, 2002, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, amended by, 2002 O.J. (L 225) 1
[hereinafter Brussels Regulation]. Denmark is not under the regulation and
continues to follow the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. See Brussels Con-
vention, supra note 11; Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L
319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
13. This article does not focus on efforts of judicial integration in the
European Union (EU) except as they relate specifically to parallel proceed-
ings, lis pendens, and declining jurisdiction in connection with recognition
and enforcement of judgments. For a discussion of antisuit injunctions and
the Brussels Convention/Regulation, see Clare Ambrose, Can Anti-Suit In-
junctions Survive European Community Law?, 52.2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401
(2003). The article discusses Turner v. Grovit, an English case discussed infra
at Part V, in which the European Court of Justice addressed the issue of the
use of an injunction to restrain proceedings in abuse of process within the
context of the Brussels Convention. Turner v. Grovit, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 107
(H.L. 2001), preliminary reference made, Case C-159/02, [2003] ECR __
[2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 216, judgement of the full court, [2004] ECR 00 (27 Apr.
2004), [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 169; see also Richard Fentiman, Ousting Juris-
diction and the European Conventions, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF
EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES, 107 (Alan Dashwood et al. eds., 2001); Trevor C.
Hartley, How to Abuse the Law and (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-Faith
Proceedings under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
zation internationally of the treatment of parallel proceedings, a
heightened awareness of its connection with judgment enforce-
ment represents a significant step forward.
On the reverse end of a lawsuit, the inability to enforce judg-
ments from one forum in another forum also creates multiple pro-
ceedings. 14 There is neither a constitutional nor federal statutory
requirement to give full faith and credit to a foreign judgment, as
opposed to a sister state judgment. 15 Rather, the enforcement of
foreign judgments within the United States is largely a matter of
state law16 and is basically controlled by common law except in
those states that have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (the Uniform Act).17 More than half of
the states have currently adopted some version of the Uniform
Act, although the states vary in the exceptions to recognition, in-
cluding the requirement of reciprocity which currently is de-
manded only in eight states.18 The ALI is presently drafting a
statute that would federalize the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments within the United States 19 and that would im-
pose a reciprocity requirement. 20 These efforts would help create a
LAw AND JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 73 [hereinafter Hartley, How to Abuse the
Law].
14. See generally TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 251-292;
see discussion infra Part VI.
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
16. Federal courts in diversity jurisdiction, which is generally the basis
for jurisdiction of suits involving foreign parties, apply state law for recogni-
tion and enforcement under the Erie doctrine. See Hunt v. BP Exploration
Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885, 892 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Somportex, Ltd. v. Phila-
delphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 453
F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971). See discussion infra Part VI.
17. 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986) [hereinafter UFMJRA]. The Act has a narrow
scope, covering only money judgments, leaving the remainder for common
law development. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) is currently working on updating and amending the
UFMJRA. See Uniform Law Commissioners, at http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/.
18. See infra note 234.
19. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 10;
see discussion infra Part VII.C.
20. Id. at § 7. The reciprocity requirement is controversial. It was the fo-
cus of much of the debate at the May 2004 ALI annual meeting, where a mo-
2004]
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consistent approach, making "importing" of foreign judgments
turn in part on the treatment of U.S. judgments abroad.
Nor can one easily or freely "export" U.S. judgments for en-
forcement abroad since the United States is not a party to any
multilateral convention enforcing foreign civil judgments. In con-
trast, certain countries, such as the members of the European
Community and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
have worked to provide free movement of foreign judgments by re-
ducing divergent treatment of jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments.21 The Hague Conference on Private International Law
has been working on a convention since 1992 that would establish
standards for jurisdiction and for subsequent recognition of judg-
ments. The proposed convention was one that would not only treat
recognition and enforcement of judgments but also establish the
bases of jurisdiction that would be acceptable for enforcement.
The jurisdictional component of the convention proved to be
the more problematic in negotiations because there are significant
and controversial differences among countries as to acceptable
bases of jurisdiction. U.S. notions of doing-business and tag juris-
diction, and our emphasis on the relationship of the defendant's
activities to the forum, differ from personal jurisdiction concepts
elsewhere. The process has continued for the last decade without
resolution due to a multitude of factors ranging from disagree-
ment over basic concepts of adjudicative jurisdiction, differences in
the treatment of consumers, problems arising from the internet
and e-commerce, and the increasing internal integration of judi-
cial process within the European Community.22 A decision was
tion to delete the reciprocity portion of section 7 failed. See Actions Taken
With Respect to Drafts Submitted at 2004 Annual Meeting (American Law In-
stitute, Fall 2004), at http://www.ali.org.
21. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 11; Brussels Regula-
tion, supra note 12; Lugano Convention, supra note 12; see also RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE
BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS (Gerhard Walter & Samuel P.
Baumgartner eds., 2000).
22. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, International
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague
Conference), Some Reflections on the Present State of Negotiations on the
Judgments Project in the Context of the Future Work Programme of the Con-
ference, Prel. Doc. No. 16 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc.
No. 16], available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited
Oct. 7, 2004); Hague Conference, The Impact of the Internet on the Judgments
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
made after 2001 to put a comprehensive convention on hold and
instead to tackle a smaller project.23 As discussed in more detail
below, these recent attempts to negotiate a scaled-back convention
that would address choice of court clauses in the commercial con-
text offer significant hope for progress in enforcing foreign judg-
ments resulting from consensual agreements and provide
certainty to businesses in selecting fora for resolution of subse-
quent disputes. In the process, this commercial choice of court
convention also offers a lis pendens solution to parallel litigation
contrary to forum selection clauses.
II. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS - WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND
At first blush one might question the relationship of parallel
proceedings and enforcement of judgment in the international
context. Yet if one views the process of litigation as a chronological
timeline, one of the crucial questions driving initial filing consid-
erations is the possibility of, and potential problems with, enforc-
ing any resulting judgment at the end of the suit.24 Along the way,
Project: Thoughts for the Future, Prel. Doc. No. 17 (Feb. 2002) (prepared by
Avril D. Haines) [hereinafter Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 171, available at
http://www.hcch.nete/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004); Hague
Conference, Reflection Paper to Assist in the Preparation of a Convention on
Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Prel. Doc. No. 19 (Aug. 2002) (prepared by Andrea
Schulz) [hereinafter Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 19], available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004); Hague
Conference, The Relationship Between the Judgments Project and Other In-
ternational Instruments, Prel. Doc. No. 24 (Dec. 2003) (prepared by Andrea
Schulz) [hereinafter Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 24], available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004); see also
Fausto Pocar, The Drafting of a World-Wide Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments: Which Format for the Negotiations in The
Hague?, in LAw AND JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 191.
23. Commission I on General Affairs and Policy of the Nineteenth Diplo-
matic Session met in April 2002 and decided "to move to an interim informal
process, exploring new ways of negotiating.. . ." Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No.
19, supra note 22, at 5-15; Letter of Hans van Loon, Secretary General of
the Hague Conference, Convocation Special Commission on Judgments, 1-9
December 2003 (August 19, 2003) (copy on file with author). For the latest
draft of the Choice of Court Convention, as well as the older and more ambi-
tious drafts, see the Hague Conference on Private International Law's web-
site, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html.
24. See generally TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 101-05; see
discussion infra Part VI.
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one may have to reevaluate both the choice of initial forum and
potential enforcement several times during the litigation process
based on decisions and actions of the opposing party. Indeed one
factor determining initial filing or subsequent strategy might be
the existence of an earlier-filed action in another forum or a sub-
sequently filed defensive action in another forum. Parallel pro-
ceedings exist because of concurrent jurisdiction, both adjudicative
and prescriptive. 25 Problems of enforcement of foreign judgments
arise in part from differing notions of adjudicative and prescrip-
tive jurisdiction. Thus, when Country B is faced with the issue of
enforcing a judgment from Country A, it must consider whether
Country A, the rendering forum, had an acceptable basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction and whether it had the power to regulate the
particular conduct. Often Country B is faced with this problem
while there is still ongoing litigation or arbitration of the same or
related matter, in Country B or in Country C, a third unrelated
country. Alternatively, Country B has to decide which of more
than one judgment it should recognize. Thus, the same problems
motivating parties to file more than one proceeding also impact
eventual enforcement.
The response of other countries to parallel proceedings is ex-
pressed under various doctrines which govern the enjoining of
party participation in foreign proceedings or the staying of pend-
ing proceedings. Countries that are signatories of the Brussels
Convention, now the Brussels Regulation, or the Lugano Conven-
tion adopt a strict lis pendens rule that jurisdiction generally rests
with the court first obtaining jurisdiction, and other litigation is
stayed "until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised
is established."26 The Regulation leaves no discretion for the court
to defer in favor of another court, other than the one first seized
under the Regulation (or Convention).27
The lack of shared standards for parallel proceedings -
25. Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to personal jurisdiction, or the court's
power over a person or entity. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to a state or
country's ability "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or
status of persons, or the interest of persons in things. . . ." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT].
26. Brussels Regulation, supra note 12, art. 27(1).
27. Brussels Convention, supra note 11, art. 21. See discussion infra Part
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
stay/defer, enjoin the parties from acting in the other suit, or con-
tinue both independently - within the United States and interna-
tionally, allows parallel proceedings to thrive and creates
subsequent problems of enforceability. At the root of the problem
are the fundamental differences in attitudes toward parallel pro-
ceedings and judicial discretion. How a legal system chooses to
treat multiple proceedings is illustrative of its attitudes about
"comity." Comity is an implicit concern in both parallel proceed-
ings and enforcement of judgments. Although the classic definition
of comity in the United States is derived from Hilton v. Guyot,2s an
1895 Supreme Court case dealing with enforcement of judgments,
the concept comes into play as well when a court is forced to con-
sider how to react to parallel proceedings. 29 Two of the potential
responses - one court deferring to another or both courts continu-
ing - reflect a willingness to accord some comity to the foreign
sovereign's courts. Thus any attempt to reach an agreement about
enforcing judgments will also have to consider the treatment of
parallel proceedings, either as part of the jurisdiction provisions or
as part of the consideration of the basis for nonrecognition at the
time of enforcement, or at both times.
A. Origins and Responses to Parallel Proceedings
Given the increasingly transnational character of daily trans-
actions, litigants are considerably more likely to find themselves
embroiled in simultaneous proceedings in two or more locations,
one of which might even be cyberspace. 30 Varied circumstances
can result in duplicative litigation in multiple forums, either si-
multaneously or successively. There is also the possibility that the
second forum is not a court but an arbitral tribunal. Parallel pro-
ceedings result from a myriad of causes, not only concurrent juris-
diction. The availability of different procedural systems
encourages forum shopping, even when one action has already
been filed. U.S. courts offer extensive discovery, jury trials, and
the possibility of large damage awards, encouraging parties to
28. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in Interna-
tional Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991).
29. This assumes the system has no mandatory lis pendens rules.
30. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Parallel Proceedings: Moving into Cyberspace,
35 INT'L ILAw. 491, 493-95 (2001) [hereinafter Teitz, Moving into Cyberspace].
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bring actions in the United States. 31 Similarly, the existence of dif-
ferent underlying substantive law and forum bias for its own law
also encourage filing suit on "home ground," even if suit is already
filed elsewhere. Parallel proceedings may also be purely vexatious,
intended to increase the burdens on an opponent and the cost and
time of litigating.
Regardless of the reasons for the multiple proceedings, there
are three possible responses: (1) stay or dismiss the domestic ac-
tion; (2) enjoin the parties from proceeding in the foreign forum
(referred to as an antisuit injunction); or (3) allow both suits to
proceed simultaneously, with the likely attendant race to judg-
ment. The proliferation of multiple proceedings has led to a vari-
ety of approaches, both here and abroad, which are reflected in
U.S. decisions. Often the analyses, developed purely for domestic
use, for responses (2) and (3) are intertwined; when a request for
response (2) is denied, response (3) is the usual result. Thus, the
rules for allowing parallel proceedings and issuing antisuit injunc-
tions are reverse images. There are of course variations on these
responses, both among foreign countries and within the United
States.32
The approach traditionally urged in U.S. courts as to litiga-
tion in multiple forums has been to allow parallel proceedings to
continue simultaneously: "[P]arallel proceedings on the same in
personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simulta-
neously, at least until a judgment is reached in one which can be
pled as res judicata in the other."33 International litigation dis-
persed in multiple countries is treated as analogous to lawsuits in
different states within the United States. It is impossible to con-
solidate actions in two states or in two countries without first de-
parting from one system, either through dismissal or stay. Once
31. "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United
States." Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A.
1982) (Lord Denning, MR).
32. For example, a court may dismiss an action rather than stay it. The
response to a forum non conveniens motion in a U.S. federal court is dis-
missal. In some states, such as California, the response is a stay.
33. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Scheiner v. Wallace, 832 F. Supp. 687, 693
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), dismissed by, sanctions disallowed, 860 F. Supp. 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("general rule of comity requires domestic court to exercise
jurisdiction concurrently with foreign court").
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one suit has reached judgment, the prevailing party generally
seeks to foreclose further action in the remaining suit.34 While this
approach works within the United States where the constitutional
guarantee of full faith and credit extends to a sister state's judg-
ment, there is no international equivalent to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. First to judgment does not mean first to enforce-
ment. In the international arena, when a party seeks to enforce
the judgment from the first-finished suit in the second country, re-
litigation may be necessary, at least when the rendering forum is
the United States and the enforcing forum is outside the United
States.
A second potential response to parallel proceedings is to defer
to another forum, either (1) staying the pending action until an ac-
tion in another forum is resolved or (2) dismissing the pending ac-
tion, with or without conditions, in favor of an action pending in
another forum. Generally, the basis for requesting a stay is the in-
convenience, practical or financial, of litigating in several loca-
tions. Indeed, in American practice, parties often join the motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens with an alternative motion to
stay.35 American courts have shown inconsistency in their willing-
ness to defer to courts of other sovereigns. The difficulty arises in
deciding whether to categorize parallel proceedings between a
U.S. court and a foreign court as analogous to the state/federal,
state/state or federal/federal relationship, 36 since there are differ-
ent precedents for each relationship.37
34. See, e.g., Scheiner, 832 F. Supp. at 693.
35. Some U.S. federal courts have treated motions to stay pending for-
eign proceedings as equivalent to, or together with, motions to dismiss for fo-
rum non conveniens. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear
Corp. de Mexico, 44 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 1994). The assumption that staying an
action allows the result in the foreign action to control is only partially cor-
rect since it does not take into consideration the ultimate issue of recognition
and enforcement of judgments and the location of assets that might be used
to satisfy the judgment.
36. Compare, e.g., Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines,
925 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting notion that a federal court owes
greater deference to foreign courts than state courts), with Brinco Mining,
Ltd. v. Federal Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233, 1242-43 (D.D.C. 1982) (treating
standard as same as between two federal courts). See, e.g., AAR Int'l, Inc. v.
Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001); Posner v. Essex In-
surance Co., 178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999); Szabo v. CGU Int'l Ins., PLC,
199 F. Supp. 2d 715 (W.D. Ohio 2002).
37. See General Electric Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150, 152 (3d Cir.
20041
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This is particularly true when the federal court chooses to de-
fer or declines to proceed. When the federal court has jurisdiction
but chooses not to exercise it in deference to another proceeding,
usually that of a state, this discretionary refusal implicates the
doctrine of abstention. However, when the federal court defers to a
court of another country rather than a state, the argument is gen-
erally couched in terms of "comity."3s While comity initially was
considered in connection with recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment, amounting to giving extraterritorial effect to
another sovereign's laws, its use has been extended to a general
concept of "courtesy." Comity then becomes a basis for a federal
court to abstain from acting, including refusing to enjoin parallel
proceedings, 39 and has become enmeshed in the federal abstention
case law, reflecting another attempt to squeeze transnational liti-
gation problems into the existing mold of domestic lawsuits.
A stay in favor of proceedings in a foreign court is discretion-
ary, based on the inherent power of the court to control its own
docket. 40 The basis for a stay in federal court has often been tied
explicitly to judicial efficiency4l and to the impact on the system,
2001); see also Advantage Int'l Mgmt. v. Martinez, No. 93 Civ. 6227 (MBM),
1994 WL 482114 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1994):
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed specifically the cri-
teria that courts should consider when determining the propriety of
staying or dismissing a federal action in deference to another lawsuit
pending in a foreign jurisdiction, courts faced with this issue have
articulated a standard premised, in part, on analogous Supreme
Court precedent concerning the contemporaneous exercise of juris-
diction by federal courts, or by federal and state courts. See, e.g.,
Caspian Invs., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817).
Id. at *2.
38. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). The Supreme Court de-
fined comity as follows:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion nor of mere courtesy and good will .... But it is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. See generally Paul, supra note 28.
39. See discussion infra Part II.B.
40. See, e.g., Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Trujillo
v. Conover & Co. Communications, 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000).
41. One court explained the relationship this way:
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at least in the case of abstention under the Colorado River 42 doc-
trine. In Colorado River, a purely domestic case, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that federal courts had a "virtually unflag-
ging obligation.., to exercise the jurisdiction given them,"43 but
proceeded to provide a checklist of factors to be balanced to deter-
mine if the case fell within one of the limited circumstances in
which federal courts should abstain in "the presence of a concur-
rent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administra-
tion. .. ."44 In its subsequent refinement and limitation of
Colorado River, the Supreme Court has characterized the para-
mount concern in that case as " [the] avoidance of piecemeal litiga-
tion. .. ."'45 Under the Colorado River doctrine, a court looks to see
if either forum has jurisdiction over the property at issue:
In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event
of an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction [federal/state], a
federal court may also consider such factors as the incon-
venience of the federal forum; the desirability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation; and the order in which jurisdiction
was obtained by the concurrent forums... [no] other
Numerous factors bear on the propriety of staying litigation while a
foreign proceeding is pending. They include pragmatic concerns such
as the promotion of judicial efficiency and the related questions
whether the two actions have parties and issues in common and
whether the alternative forum is likely to render a prompt
disposition. Also relevant are considerations of fairness to all parties
or possible prejudice to any of them. A third group of concerns re-
lates to comity between nations. When as in this case the foreign ac-
tion is pending rather than decided, comity counsels that priority
generally goes to the suit first filed.
Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omit-
ted).
Other cases have provided different formulations for the test to deter-
mine whether to grant a stay. See, e.g., Dragon Capital Partners L.P. v.
Merrill Lynch Capital Servs., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Conti-
nental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (adding temporal sequence to the factors in LJ.A., Inc. v. Marine Hold-
ings, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
42. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976).
43. Id. at 817.
44. Id. at 818-19.
45. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16
(1983) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819).
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factor is necessarily determinative. 46
Some federal cases reflect hostility to relying on Colorado
River to stay cases in favor of foreign proceedings. For example,
the Ninth Circuit, in a recent case it described as "an ordinary
commercial dispute over the loss of cargo," reversed the district
court's granting of a stay pending the outcome of proceedings in
Switzerland because the circuit court found no "exceptional cir-
cumstances" to justify abstention.47 Relying on cases that involve
state/federal disputes, the court emphasized that "conflicting re-
sults, piecemeal litigation, and some duplication of judicial effort
is the unavoidable price of preserving access to... federal relief."48
The court then reasoned that the foreign aspect was "immaterial,"
and that "no greater deference" was owed to foreign courts than
state courts. 49
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's approach, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia determined that a foreign court,
in this case a Canadian one, was owed the same degree of defer-
ence as another federal court. 50 The court applied the Colorado
River test, stating that "the concerns that federalism normally
presents for a diversity court are not implicated in this case."5 1 In
dismissing, the court relied on "international comity" and a "well-
founded aversion to forum shopping on an international scale," as
well as application of the Colorado River factors. 52
A recent District Court decision within the Sixth Circuit is
also typical of the attempt to fit purely domestic doctrine into in-
ternational proceedings. The court, facing reverse parallel declara-
tory actions in connection with uninsured motorist insurance,
refused to abstain in favor of the London action, relying on Colo-
46. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818 (citations omitted).
47. Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193,
1194-95 (9th Cir. 1991).
48. Id. at 1195 (quoting Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984)).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Brinco Mining, Ltd. v. Federal Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233, 1240(D.D.C. 1982). The court stated two facts for support: (1) the other forum was
Canada, which was also a common-law country; and (2) the plaintiff was try-
ing to use the U.S. court to circumvent proceedings it had originally brought
in its own country. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1242.
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
rado River abstention: "The same principles which govern parallel
state and federal proceedings apply to parallel proceedings in a
foreign court."53 The court proceeded to apply the eight factors
from Moses Cone, another domestic precedent, giving strong
weight to the ability of the English insurer to litigate in the
United States, the lack of "exceptional circumstances" to justify
abstention, and a comment by the English judge that should Ohio
law be determined to govern, the Ohio proceedings should deal
with matters of Ohio law. 54
B. Comity and International Abstention in the Last Decade
A decade ago, federal courts, led by the Eleventh Circuit, be-
gan espousing a new doctrine of deference described as "interna-
tional abstention," a term reflecting the inconsistent precedents.
This doctrinal approach - while similar to "comity" as used by
some courts, such as those in the Second Circuit 55 - takes its roots
initially from the federal abstention doctrine involving federal and
state proceedings. In one of the first major international absten-
tion cases, Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH,56 the
Eleventh Circuit, in a later-filed reverse breach of contract suit,
deferred to pending German litigation in connection with proceed-
ings involving a license agreement concerning television broad-
casts. The court acknowledged a duty to exercise jurisdiction, but
proceeded to consider the two lines of precedent, and to create an
53. Szabo v. CGU Int'l Ins., PLC, 199 F. Supp. 2d 715, 719 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (citing AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th
Cir. 2001)).
54. Id. at 720-21.
55. See, e.g., Rapture Shipping, Ltd. v. Allaround Fuel Trading B.V., No.
03 Civ. 738 (JFK), 2004 WL 253339 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2004) (holding that
pursuant to the principles of comity, the judgment of a Netherlands court
would be honored); Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(dismissing on grounds of international comity and forum non conveniens a
class action brought by Ecuador residents against a U.S. oil company for
damages caused by oil exploration), vacated, Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d
153 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing for forum non conveniens subject to condition
of Texaco's consent to jurisdiction in Ecuador), remanded to Aquinda v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that because Texaco
had submitted to jurisdiction in Ecuador, and the strong presumption for
plaintiffs forum was overcome by private and public factors favoring the al-
ternative forum, Texaco's motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds
was granted), aff d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
56. 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994).
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international abstention doctrine:
This circuit has never considered the question of "inter-
national abstention." In other federal courts, at least two
distinct but very similar approaches to international ab-
stention have developed. Both have lifted criteria for
analysis from case law concerning concurrent jurisdiction
between federal and state courts.
... These two sets of principles overlap to a large ex-
tent, and we find both lines of cases helpful to our analy-
sis. Taking the two approaches together, courts have
sought to fashion principles that will promote three read-
ily identifiable goals in the area of concurrent interna-
tional jurisdiction: (1) a proper level of respect for the acts
of our fellow sovereign nations - a rather vague concept
referred to in American jurisprudence as international
comity; (2) fairness to litigants; and (3) efficient use of
scarce judicial resources.57
The court also considered fairness, which was composed of three
elements: (1) order of filing; (2) convenience of the forum; and (3)
possible prejudice to the parties resulting from abstention.58
A similar result was reached in the later Eleventh Circuit
case, Posner v. Essex Insurance Co.,5 9 where the court rejected the
argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Quackenbush v.
Allstate Insurance Co.60 was relevant to domestic cases. In Quack-
57. Id. at 1518.
58. Id. at 1521-22.
59. 178 F.3d 1209, 1222-24 (11th Cir. 1999).
60. 517 U.S. 706 (1996). Some federal courts, especially the district
courts, appear to have hastily seized upon the language in Quackenbush
about the ability of a federal court to dismiss only in cases of equitable relief,
and therefore these courts have emphasized the need to "stay" as opposed to
"dismiss" the pending United States litigation.
For an interesting discussion of the issue of applying Quackenbush in
the international context and the need for a stay, rather than a dismissal, see
767 Third Avenue Assocs. v. Consulate General of the Socialist Fed. Republic
of Yugoslavia, 60 F. Supp. 2d 267, 278-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), in which the Dis-
trict Court stayed litigation involving a dispute over rented diplomatic offices
in connection with the disintegration of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia as a non-justiciable political question:
The deference that is necessary here is deference to an executive
branch foreign policy determination, which itself is a policy of defer-
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enbush, the Supreme Court surveyed the domestic abstention doc-
trines and held that federal courts had the power to dismiss or
remand only in equitable relief cases.61 In Posner, a Florida indi-
vidual and majority shareholder of SMC, a privately held Mary-
land corporation, sued Essex, a Bermuda insurer that was owned
35% by SMC and 65% by Salem, a Pennsylvania corporation of
which Posner owned 49%. The suits alleged a variety of claims, in-
cluding financial mismanagement and breach of contract, in con-
nection with failure to pay claims on insurance policies. Essex,
after denying the claims, filed a declaratory judgment action in
Bermuda on the validity of the insurance policies.
The district court dismissed all claims in the United States on
grounds of personal jurisdiction or international abstention. 62 In
reviewing the portion of the lower court's action dismissing in fa-
vor of the parallel Bermuda litigation, the Eleventh Circuit ad-
dressed the plaintiffs argument that Quackenbush removes the
discretion of the district court to abstain in a nonequitable claim,
the sort at issue here:63 "Read in the proper context ... the Su-
preme Court's admonition that courts generally must exercise
their non-discretionary authority in cases over which Congress
has granted them jurisdiction can apply only to those abstention
doctrines addressing the unique concerns of federalism."64 Finding
that Quackenbush did not control in the realm of international
litigation and that Turner was the controlling precedent, the Elev-
enth Circuit then applied the three Turner factors to decide what
to do in relation to an earlier-filed Bermuda action. The court re-
viewed the basis for abstention, finding that the Bermuda forum
was competent, that it was fair to allow the earlier-filed Bermuda
action to proceed, but modified the dismissal to a stay.65 The Elev-
ence to ongoing international efforts. The principles underlying the
choice of a stay over a dismissal apply equally when the deference
motivating abstention bases not on constitutional federalism and
federal-state comity, but instead, as here, on constitutional separa-
tion of powers and national-international comity.
Id. at 282.
61. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731.
62. Posner, 178 F.3d at 1213-1214.
63. Id. at 1222-1223.
64. Id. at 1223.
65. Id. at 1224. The Court stated:
With respect to the first factor, international comity, the district
2004]
18 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.10:1
enth Circuit, although abstaining in favor of parallel foreign liti-
gation, correctly acknowledged that domestic abstention doctrines
are inapplicable to relationships "between federal courts and for-
eign nations (grounded in the historical notion of comity)." 66 The
Eleventh Circuit has continued to create a jurisprudence that rec-
ognizes the differences between domestic and international litiga-
tion, as illustrated by the decision in Posner.67
Comity as the basis for staying U.S. litigation in deference to
foreign litigation, especially when the foreign suit was filed first,
has become an increasingly acceptable approach during the last
decade, even in light of the intervening Quackenbush decision.
The doctrine of international abstention explicitly incorporates
"comity" through the first factor of "proper respect."68 Courts have
continued to cobble together a collection of factors to consider
when deciding whether to abstain in the international context.
Courts have begun to realize the "overarching concerns for a fed-
eral court facing concurrent international jurisdiction including
demonstrating a proper level of respect for the acts of other sover-
eign nations, ensuring fairness to litigants, and efficiently using
scarce judicial resources."69
In another example during the decade, Goldhammer v. Dun-
kin'Donuts, Inc.,70 involving proceedings in two common-law fo-
court found no evidence that the Bermuda court was not competent
to hear the claims or would not use fair and just proceedings ....
The district court also noted that the insurance "policies are gov-
erned by Bermuda law, and their underwriter Essex, is a Bermuda
corporation".... As the district court recognized, the second and
third Turner factors - fairness and judicial resources - also counsel
in favor of abstention. With respect to fairness, the facts that Essex
filed a year before the commencement of this case, and allowing both
actions to proceed risks inconsistent judgments, outweigh any con-
venience that the parties might enjoy in the Florida forum. Fi-
nally ... they ... involve significantly common issues and parties.
Id.
66. Id. at 1223; see also Linear Products, Inc. v. Marotech, Inc., 189 F.
Supp. 2d 461, 464-68 (W.D. Va. 2002).
67. See, e.g., Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312 (11th
Cir. 2004); Seguros Del Estado, S.A. v. Scientific Games, Inc., 262 F.3d 1164
(11th Cir. 2001).
68. Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th
Cir. 1994).
69. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp.
2d 1243, 1247 (D. Colo. 2000).
70. 59 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D. Mass. 1999).
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
rums, 71 a District Court in the First Circuit also considered defen-
dant's motion to dismiss the U.S. lawsuit in favor of an earlier-
filed English action. The court put together a "roster of relevant
factors" for ruling on the motion, taken from earlier cases in sev-
eral courts, 72 including: (1) similarity of parties and issues (here
minimal differences); (2) promotion of judicial efficiency ("not dis-
positive," but a "key factor"); (3) adequacy of relief in the alterna-
tive forum (here Dunkin' Donuts U.K. claims that it will lose its
Massachusetts unfair and deceptive trade practices claim); (4)
fairness and convenience of the parties, counsel, and witnesses
(equal here); (5) possibility of prejudice (consideration of different
procedures available); and (6) temporal sequence of filing.73 The
court's analysis in Goldhammer is interesting in its incorporation
of significant aspects of a forum non conveniens analysis - specifi-
cally reducing the "fairness" factor to convenience of the parties,
counsel, and witnesses - and analyzing procedural differences in
discovery available in the United States, as opposed to what
amounts to the "alternative forum," here England. 74 The impor-
71. Id. at 249-50. In both concurrent litigation cases and forum non con-
veniens cases, the significance of a common legal tradition receives some
weight, even when unstated: "Because the United States and England share
the same common law heritage, deference to British proceedings is consistent
with notions of international comity." Id. at 254-55.
72. Id. at 252. Many of the factors appear in Caspian Investments, Ltd. v.
Viacom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y 1991). The facts and
analysis are also similar to Dragon Capital Partners L.P. v. Merrill Lynch
Capital Services., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See Louise Ellen
Teitz, International Litigation, Parallel Proceedings: Treading Carefully, 32
INT'L LAw. 223, 225 (1998) [hereinafter Teitz, Treading Carefully] (discussing
the relevant factors of Dragon Capital).
73. Goldhammer, 59 F. Supp. 2d. at 252-53; see also Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1247-49 (discussing the individual
factors); see also AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Vacanes Heliades S.A., 100 F. Supp. 2d
875, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters
U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1999)), rev'd, 250 F.3d 510 (7th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 995 (2001); Sabre, Inc. v. Air Canada, Inc.,
No. 3-02-CV-2016-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23697, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9,
2002) (providing a list of factors to weigh in considering forum non conven-
iens).
74. In response to Dunkin' Donuts U.K.'s concerns that it could not take
pre-trial depositions in England, the court commented on the new procedural
rules in England as yet untried: "As the federal courts grapple with control-
ling discovery costs and English courts look to expand discovery rights, soon
the key difference between the two systems might be in the wigs." Goldham-
mer, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 254 n.1.
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tance of comity, especially when there is a shared "common law
heritage" is stressed at several points: 75 "[N]otions of international
comity are at an apex when parties inject themselves into the
economy of another nation for profit, particularly one as close as
Great Britain, and then try to extricate themselves from its juris-
diction."76
These cases illustrate the confusion and conflicting treatment
of parallel proceedings by U.S. courts involving American and for-
eign courts. In addition, they demonstrate the use of "comity" as a
basis for abstaining, thus deferring to another forum, as opposed
to being used as justification for allowing parallel proceedings in
both forums to continue.7 7 Staying parallel proceedings even when
75. Id. at 254-55.
76. Id. at 255-56. In MLC (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Credit Suisse First Boston
Corp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), another case involving multiple
proceedings in the United States and England, the federal court for the
Southern District of New York applied similar factors, taken also in part from
Caspian Invs., Ltd. v. Viacom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y
1991), to dismiss the U.S. action in deference to the pending prior proceed-
ings in London.
The court in MLC actually adds a factor not usually seen in an analysis
of whether to stay or dismiss in deference to parallel litigation - the plain-
tiffs choice of forum - which the court here states "is entitled to much less
weight when it is made after the filing of a concurrent action arising out of
the same series of transactions." MLC, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 254. The considera-
tion of plaintiffs choice of forum is generally reserved for forum non conven-
iens and personal jurisdiction analysis.
The court also seems to suggest that whenever there are two suits, only
one should proceed - the other court should, it is assumed, defer: "[D]ismissal
will likewise promote judicial economy. Where a single court is capable of
fairly and competently adjudicating an entire controversy, there is little rea-
son to divide the task between two courts." Id. For an interesting comparison,
one can look at the English proceeding involving a portion of this litigation in
the Commercial Court in London, where the court issued a limited antisuit
injunction as to certain claims, which were then eliminated from the U.S.
complaint. Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd. v. MLC (Bermuda) Ltd.,
[19991 1 Lloyd's Rep. 767, 779-83 (Q.B. 1998).
77. See, e.g., Advantage Int'l Mgt., Inc. v. Martinez, No. 93 Civ. 6227
(MBM), 1994 WL 482114, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1994) (citing Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 817-18). The Court explained this concept:
Courts use the terms comity and, to a lesser extent, international
abstention, to refer to the doctrine of judicial deference to pending
foreign proceedings ... although neither of these terms technically is
appropriate. Comity refers to deference to another sovereign's defini-
tive law or judicial decision, see Hilton v. Guyot,... not to its pre-
liminary decision to enact a law or issue a judgment. Abstention is a
jurisdiction limiting doctrine relevant only to a limited category of
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the parties and issues are not identical has been approved by sev-
eral courts when the court foresees the ability to use the first
judgment to preclude further litigation.78 The longer the litigation
has been proceeding when the second suit is filed and the stage
that the initial litigation has reached appear to be decisive factors
when ruling on a motion to stay the parallel proceeding. Courts
are reluctant to allow a party to use a late-filed subsequent action
to frustrate ongoing proceedings. When the second suit is filed in
the United States, courts are more willing to defer to the foreign
proceeding, and more reluctant to enjoin the continuation of the
foreign proceeding.
Throughout the last decade then one finds more and more
courts, when faced with parallel proceedings, staying or dismiss-
ing the U.S. action, especially if it is the later-filed suit, viewing
this as an appropriate response to concurrent jurisdiction and one
dictated by both judicial efficiency and a growing awareness of
"comity." In addition, one finds more and more courts acknowledg-
ing the need for developing jurisprudence for parallel interna-
tional cases apart from that used for domestic situations of
litigation because of the failure of domestic precedent to incorpo-
rate the added concerns of foreign sovereigns.
III. ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS DURING THE DECADE
Enjoining parties from proceeding in another forum, the third
possible response to parallel litigation, is clearly the most abra-
sive. Injunctions therefore are and should be difficult to obtain.
While the injunctive relief sought is technically against the parties
rather than the foreign court, the impact is often the same and the
offense to the other court's jurisdiction and sovereignty is as obvi-
ous. 79 During the last decade, an increasing number of courts ad-
vocated restraint in the granting of antisuit injunctions, not only
cases concerning constitutional adjudication and state-federal
relations.
Id.
78. See, e.g., Herbstein v. Breutman, 743 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Black & Decker Corp. v. Sanyei Am. Corp., 650 F. Supp. 406 ( N.D. Ill. 1986).
79. Cf Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996). Here
the Fifth Circuit found specifically that the dispute was essentially private
and the antisuit injunction granted by the district court did not "[trample] on
notions of comity." Id. at 627.
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in the United States but abroad as well, in most cases, other than
perhaps defamation cases.
Federal courts in the United States deciding whether to en-
join parallel proceedings in foreign forums generally divide into
two camps:80 the First, Second, Third, Sixth and D.C. Circuits that
follow the Laker "sparingly used" approach;8' and the Fifth, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits that use the more liberal approach. s2 As-
suming that the suits involve the same parties and that the
resolution of the case in the enjoining court would be dispositive of
80. For a thorough discussion of the two approaches to antisuit injunc-
tions, see George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in Interna-
tional Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (1990); Note, Antisuit
Injunctions and International Comity, 71 VA. L. REV. 1039 (1985). For an in-
teresting analysis of parallel proceedings circuit by circuit, see Margarita
Trevino de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain? A Survey of Foreign
Parallel Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United States, 17 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 79 (1999); Trevor C. Hartley, Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctions
in International Litigation, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 487 (1987); Russell J. Wein-
traub, Parallel Litigation and Forum-Selection Clauses, in LAW AND JUSTICE,
supra note 8.
For the Canadian perspective on antisuit injunctions and parallel pro-
ceedings, see JEFFREY TALPIs, "IF I AM FROM GRAND-MERE, WHY AM I BEING
SUED IN TEXAS?" RESPONDING TO INAPPROPRIATE JURISDICTION IN QUEBEC-
UNITED STATES CROSSBORDER LITIGATION (2001). For the use of antisuit in-
junctions in the U.K., see ADRIAN BRIGGS & PETER REES, CIVIL JURISDICTION
AND JUDGMENTS §§ 5.33-5.50 (3d ed. 2002). A negative declaration can also be
used in lieu of an antisuit injunction. See generally Andrew S. Bell, The Nega-
tive Declaration in Transnational Litigation, 111 LAw Q. REV. 674 (1995).
81. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984). The case itself provides a lengthy history of the litigation, as
well as a description of proceedings in England. Id. at 917-21. See also British
Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413; see generally Gary B.
Born, Recent British Responses to the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Law: The Midland Bank Decision and Retaliatory Legislation Involv-
ing Unitary Taxation, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 91 (1985); Aryeh S. Friedman, Laker
Airways: The Dilemma of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Conflicting National
Policies, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 181 (1985); Daryl Libow, Note, The Laker Anti-
trust Litigation: The Jurisdictional "Rule of Reason" Applied to Transnational
Injunctive Relief, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 645 (1986).
82. The liberal standard of enjoining parallel proceedings in cases of du-
plicative litigation is illustrated by the Fifth and Ninth Circuit approaches,
especially in In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
See also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Seattle To-
tems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855-56 (9th
Cir. 1981). The approach is also described as consisting of the five factors
enumerated in American Home Assurance Co. v. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.,
603 F. Supp. 636, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the action, courts look to see if there is an exception to the general
rule favoring concurrent litigation. The Laker approach recognizes
exceptions when the injunction is necessary (1) to protect the en-
joining court's jurisdiction or (2) to protect important public policy
of the forum. "[Diuplication of parties and issues alone is not suffi-
cient to justify the issuance of an antisuit injunction." 3 The liberal
standard of enjoining parallel proceedings in cases of duplicative
litigation, as illustrated by the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit
approaches, accords less weight to comity and more to whether the
litigation is vexatious or would result in "inequitable hardship,"
and would "tend to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient de-
termination of the cause."84
During the last ten years, this Circuit split has continued.
One can compare a recent Seventh Circuit case8 5 with a recent
Third Circuit case86 to see the differences in approach and phi-
losophy. The Seventh Circuit is aligned with the more liberal ap-
proach where duplication of parties and issues is a sufficient basis
for an antisuit injunction. The Seventh Circuit's opinion reflects
an emphasis on efficiency, while that of the Third Circuit gives
greater weight to comity and respect for foreign sovereigns and
their judicial systems. In Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bull
Data Systems,8 7 a subsidiary of a French computer manufacturer,
whose parent was a French corporation ninety percent of whose
stock was owned by the French government, obtained worldwide
insurance coverage from Allendale, a U.S. insurance company and
its British subsidiary, FMI. A subsequent fire of suspicious origin
destroyed a warehouse of computers in France valued at about
$100 million. The insurance companies, responding to a claim of
loss, sought a declaratory judgment in federal court in Illinois that
the fire was committed by arson of the insured and therefore was
outside the policy, or that if there was no arson, then coverage
would be limited to the specific policy of FMI. Bull Data filed its
own suit in Illinois against Allendale and the insurance broker. In
83. Laker, 731 F.2d at 928 (citing Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinea v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981)).
84. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
Unterweser Reederei Gmbh, 428 F.2d at 890, 896).
85. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
86. General Electric Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001).
87. 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
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addition, it instituted separate proceedings against FMI in the
Commercial Court of Lille, France, arguably the court with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over suits seeking enforcement of insurance poli-
cies governed by the French insurance code. Allendale and FMI
subsequently asked the French court to stay its proceedings pend-
ing a criminal investigation by a French magistrate which they
had sought the stay was granted.88
In the midst of discovery in the American suit, Bull Data filed
a motion to lift the stay and proceed in the French court. The Sev-
enth Circuit found the timing peculiar, given that the French
magistrate's investigation of the fire was allegedly "on the verge of
completion." 9 Not surprisingly, Allendale then moved in Illinois
for a preliminary injunction against Bull Data's continuing to liti-
gate in the French Commercial Court, which was granted by the
U.S. district court, and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, despite
that: (1) the fire occurred in France; (2) most of the evidence was
in French and located in France; and (3) one insurance policy spe-
cifically called for application of the French insurance code. 90
In granting the injunction, the Seventh Circuit placed great
weight on the arbitrator-like nature of the French tribunal and
what it viewed as the French court's insufficient experience and
resources to handle a complex case 91 - a rather chauvinistic view
of international transactions. In keeping with its narrow view-
point, the court refused to accord any weight to comity, stating
that its analysis required, unlike the stricter Laker approach, at
least some evidence that "the issuance of an injunction really
would throw a monkey wrench, however small, into the foreign re-
lations of the United States."92 The court added:
When we say we lean toward the laxer standard we do
not mean that international comity should have no
weight in the balance .... The difference between the
two lines of cases has to do with the inferences to be
drawn in the absence of information. The strict cases pre-
sume a threat to international comity whenever an in-
88. See id. at 426-27.
89. Id. at 427.
90. Id. at 426-27.
91. Id. at 429-31.
92. Id. at 431.
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junction is sought against litigating in a foreign court.9 3
Yet, the court belittled the amicus brief of the Commission de
Controle des Assurances, the French agency that regulates the in-
surance business in that country, and then suggested that "[w]e
are given no indication, moreover, that the French commission is
authorized to speak for the French state."94 Ultimately, the Sev-
enth Circuit placed great weight on the American plaintiffs need
for a U.S. forum, as well as the major shortcomings the court per-
ceived in the French "court."95
The court admitted that if the FMI policy were construed as
containing an arbitration clause requiring dispute resolution in
the Commercial Court of Lille, it would have been forced to uphold
the clause. The court maneuvered away from that restriction, say-
ing that Bull Data had not asserted the arbitration clause and in-
stead had been content to litigate its dispute in Illinois federal
court, until it suddenly tried to reactivate the French suit.9 6 Such
an undercurrent of strategic litigation, designed to harass the op-
posing party, receives greater weight in the Seventh Circuit than
in the stricter Second and D.C. Circuits, where comity outweighs
vexatiousness. 97
93. Id.
94. Id. at 432.
95. Emphasizing the plaintiffs need, the court said: "we don't think the
'strict' cases would refuse to weigh against such a threat [sic] substantial U.S.
interests. Groupe Bull is French, but Allendale is American, and the United
States has an interest in protecting its citizens, including its corporate citi-
zens, from trumped-up multi-million dollar claims." Id.
96. The court explained this point:
The injunction merely prevents a French company from seeking to
revive a dormant proceeding before an arbitral tribunal in France.
The only concern with international comity is a purely theoretical
one that ought not trump a concrete and persuasive demonstration
of harm to the applicant for the injunction, if it is denied, not offset
by any harm to the opponent if it is granted.
Id. at 432-33.
97. One recent Fifth Circuit case, Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d
624 (5th Cir. 1996), affirmed the district court's grant of an antisuit injunc-
tion, without security, in connection with a mirror image lawsuit filed in Ja-
pan by the defendant in the U.S. litigation. The court, finding that the case
was basically a private contract dispute, refused to "give greater deference to
comity" and continued to adhere to the position it had taken in earlier cases
and that followed by the Ninth and Seventh circuits. Id. at 625, 627. The
court continued: "[w]e decline, however, to require a district court to genuflect
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The Laker approach gained a majority when the Third Circuit
in 2001 officially aligned itself with the "more restrictive stan-
dard" after hinting at the importance of comity within the trans-
national litigation context in several earlier cases. 98 In General
Electric Co. v. Deutz AG, 99 the Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's order enjoining the defendant's efforts in English
courts to enforce the right to arbitration on the basis of comity,
and in the process rejected an argument that an important public
policy, "the sanctity of the jury verdict," would be threatened with-
out the injunction. 100
In Deutz, GE entered into a joint venture contract with
Moteren-Werke Mannheim AG, a German corporation, to design
and manufacture diesel engines for locomotives. Under the con-
tract, Moteren-Werke's parent, Deutz AG, would guarantee the
obligations (of design) of the subsidiary. When the joint venture
fell apart and Deutz refused to provide additional funding, GE
brought suit in federal court in Pennsylvania for breach of con-
tract. Deutz, besides challenging personal jurisdiction, also as-
serted that the contract required arbitration. In July 1999, while
the suit was pending in the district court, Deutz sought to arbi-
trate before the International Arbitration Association in London.
The district court, meanwhile, ruled that there was personal ju-
before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every time that it must de-
cide whether to enjoin a foreign action." Id. at 627. The dissent, by Judge
Emilio Garza, outlines the arguments against antisuit injunctions and in fa-
vor of international comity and the approach now used in the First, Second,
Third, Sixth and D.C. Circuits, providing a passionate plea for comity:
International comity represents a principle of paramount importance
in our world of ever increasing economic interdependence. Admitting
that "comity" may be a somewhat elusive concept does not mean that
we can blithely ignore its cautionary dictate.... Amicable relations
among sovereign nations and their judicial systems depend on our
recognition, as federal courts, that we share the international arena
with co-equal judicial bodies, and that we therefore act to deprive a
foreign court of jurisdiction only in the most extreme circumstances.
Id. at 629 (Garza, J. dissenting).
98. See, e.g., Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981), affd, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying comity
in connection with prescriptive jurisdiction in antitrust case); Armstrong
World Indus., Inc. v. Sommer Allibert, S.A., No. Civ. 97-3914, 1998 WL
195938 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 1998).
99. 270 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001).
100. Id. at 159, 162.
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risdiction and submitted to a jury the issue of whether the con-
tract language provided for arbitration. The'jury found that Deutz
was not entitled to arbitration. In April 2000, before the arbitra-
tion panel issued a decision, Deutz petitioned the High Court in
London to enjoin GE from continuing to litigate in federal court in
Pennsylvania, which the English court declined to do. At the end
of July 2000, after the London court had refused to enjoin GE and
before the arbitral panel's decision, GE convinced the district
court in the United States to do what the London court had re-
fused to do - issue an antisuit injunction, here with the parties re-
versed, and enjoin Deutz from resorting to the High Court in the
future. In November 2000, the arbitration panel held that GE and
Deutz had not agreed to arbitrate this dispute, closing the cir-
cle.101
The Third Circuit, although finding that Deutz was not enti-
tled to compel arbitration under the contract, reversed the anti-
suit injunction, in the process clearly joining with those Circuits
following a Laker, stricter approach to granting antisuit injunc-
tions: 0 2 "The circumstances here were not so aggravated as to jus-
tify interference with the jurisdiction of the courts of another
sovereign state, and there is no indication that the English courts
would have prevented General Electric from arguing the res judi-
cata effect... of the... [district court] order."0 3 In addition, the
English High Court had already refused to issue an injunction
against GE and had given no indication that it was likely to issue
one. Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that the pub-
lic policy of the forum - the importance of a jury verdict - was
threatened by the parallel litigation.'0 4 Indeed, GE's position
would insulate any jury findings from challenge in any way out-
101. Id. at 149.
102. Id. at 148-49, 160-62.
103. Id. at 159.
104. Id. The court stated:
Although the jury unquestionably has a more important role in
the American jurisprudential system than in that of any other na-
tion, its verdict is neither infallible nor immune from judicial scru-
tiny.
We have been cited to no authority that endorses enjoining pro-
ceedings in a foreign court on the grounds that an American jury
verdict might be called into question.
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side the United States and would also undermine related arbitral
tribunals, especially where there are issues of arbitrability.
The Third Circuit in Deutz repeatedly acknowledges that par-
allel litigation involving international proceedings is different
from purely domestic litigation, and thus the precedent should re-
flect different values, particularly comity. The court looks at its
own international cases and goes to great pains to show deference
to the English High Court's ruling: "Our jurisprudence thus re-
flects a serious concern for comity.... This is not an aggravated
case that calls for extraordinary intervention, nor is it sufficient
that the ruling of the arbitral panel might have jeopardized the
district court's jurisdiction."105 The Third Circuit's unwillingness
to accept a jury fact determination in a civil case as an essential
public policy of the forum is an acknowledgment that not all litiga-
tion will or need follow the American model. The Third Circuit's
opinion represents one of the very positive steps during the last
decade toward realization of the significant differences between
parallel proceedings which are wholly domestic and parallel pro-
ceedings that involve a foreign action, thus implicating different
values and comity concerns.
In March 2004, the First Circuit rejected the liberal approach
and aligned itself with the "conservative" approach, although with
some reservations. 106 In Quaak et al. v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Go-
erdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren,0 7 a securities fraud class action litiga-
tion against KPMG, the accounting firm and its Belgium office,
the appellate court affirmed the district court's granting of an in-
junction in connection with parallel proceedings in Belgium. 0 8
The district court's decision is a classic use of an antisuit injunc-
105. Id. at 161-62.
106. In re Lernout & Hauspie Secs. Litig, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22466 (D.
Mass. Dec. 12, 2003), aff'd sub. nom., Quaak et al. v. Klynveld Peat Marwick
Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004).
We reject the liberal approach. We deem international comity an im-
portant integer in the decisional calculus - and the liberal approach
assigns too low a priority to that interest. In the bargain, it under-
mines the age-old presumption in favor of concurrent parallel pro-
ceedings - a value judgment that leaves us uneasy - and presumes
that public policy always favors allowing a suit pending in an Ameri-
can court to go forward without any substantial impediment.
Quaak, 361 F.3d at 17.
107. 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004).
108. Id. at 13-14.
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tion to protect the court's own jurisdiction and to prevent circum-
vention of important forum public policies, here the vindication of
investor claims for securities fraud violating U.S. law. 10 9 The in-
vestors sued KPMG in federal court in Massachusetts and, as part
of discovery, the court ordered production of audit work papers by
KPMG-Belgium in their custody by December 1, 2003. Rather
than seeking review of the discovery order, KPMG-Belgium in-
stead went into Belgium court three days before the documents
were to be produced. On November 27, Thanksgiving Day, it
sought an ex parte order from the Belgian court to enjoin plaintiffs
from enforcing the U.S. discovery order, with a significant penalty
of one million Euros against each plaintiff for attempting en-
forcement of the U.S. order. The Belgian court denied the ex parte
application but scheduled a hearing for December 16, 2003.110
On December 1, when the documents were to have been pro-
duced under the U.S. court order, KPMG-Belgium instead pro-
vided the plaintiffs with a fax of the motion it had filed in Belgium
three days before. The plaintiffs, obviously not happy with this
turn of events, then sought their own antisuit injunction in the
U.S. court. Relying on Laker, the U.S. court looked at the tradi-
tional tests for injunctive relief - the equitable aspects - and
found that KPMG-Belgium never contested U.S. jurisdiction and
that the plaintiffs would face irreparable injury. The court also re-
jected KPMG-Belgium's primary argument that it would face
criminal penalties in Belgium if it turned over the confidential
documents."' Ultimately, the court rejected KPMG-Belgium's
claim of "inability to comply" with the U.S. court's discovery order
as a pretext and granted the antisuit injunction."12
The First Circuit, reviewing for abuse of discretion, articu-
109. In re Lernout, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22466, at *21 ("I issue this or-
der with reluctance because the Belgian courts and law must be treated with
great respect. Nonetheless, KPMG-Belgium's end-run on this Court's juris-
diction and on the federal securities laws cannot be tolerated.").
110. Id. at *20.111. Id. at'*16-21.
112. This argument and the U.S. court's response is similar to that seen in
cases following Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), which used a balancing of the plaintiffs'
attempts to get the documents by other means, the importance of the papers
for the litigation, the likelihood of harm to the defendant and the efforts to
avoid that harm.
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lated its standards for the granting of an antisuit injunction, fo-
cusing on the standards set in Laker, and emphasized that it did
not view Laker as creating only two bases for injunctions, but
rather as an analysis that put great weight on comity: 113
In an increasingly global economy, commercial transac-
tions involving participants from many lands have be-
come common fare. This world economic interdependence
has highlighted the importance of comity .... This pre-
dictability, in turn, depends on cooperation, reciprocity,
and respect among nations. That helps to explain the en-
during need for a presumption - albeit a rebuttable one -
against the issuance of international antisuit injunc-
tions.114
The First Circuit found that the district court's injunction, to pro-
tect its jurisdiction, was necessary and equitable under the cir-
cumstances: "In this case, the district court acted defensively to
protect its own authority from an interdictory strike and we are
confident that, in doing so, the court kept the balance steady and
true." 115 Thus, the granting of the antisuit injunction here rein-
forces an approach that stresses a comity analysis, not only in the
granting of injunctions but throughout the discovery process and
the entire proceedings, and reflects a significant recent trend to-
wards acknowledging the need for respect for other legal systems.
IV. IMPORTANT TRENDS OF THE LAST DECADE IN PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS
Reviewing the developments in the last ten years, one can
find some trends emerging in the treatment of parallel proceed-
ings that suggest what may happen in the next decade. Through-
out the decade there has been a strong strain of cases reflecting an
increasing awareness of the role of comity and a willingness to de-
fer to a foreign proceeding. One sees more open recognition of the
interconnected and interwoven nature of commercial litigation in
a global economy.
113. Quaak et al. v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren,
361 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2004).
114. Id. at 19.
115. Id. at 22.
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A. Cyberspace
Multiple lawsuits involving the internet have posed signifi-
cant problems, initially in terms of prescriptive jurisdiction, espe-
cially in defamation and trademark-related cases. 116 There is an
increasing likelihood of litigation seeking to enforce local domestic
laws on foreign-based websites, along with reactive litigation to
enjoin the proceeding or the enforcement of any order. The under-
lying problem, concurrent jurisdiction, will continue to spawn par-
allel proceedings as long as there are not internationally agreed
norms for conduct and control of cyberspace.
The cyberspace cases tend to break into two groups: those in-
volving issues of free speech and defamation torts, and those in-
volving issues of intellectual property, especially trademark and
domain name. The cases in the second category are in many ways
the creation and byproduct of the internet.117 Before the internet,
the scope of a trade name was more limited, usually to the physi-
cal geographic area nearby or at most nationally. For example, the
name "Crate and Barrel" in Ireland might not confuse purchasers
about the source if the internet didn't create the possibility of us-
ers confusing the Dublin store with the Chicago-based chain in the
United States."18 But the internet and "Google" searches know no
national borders so that the new technology has made it possible
to create confusion in trade names and trademarks not previously
possible in a bricks and mortar world."19
(1) Trademark and Domain Names
The confusion in trademark and intellectual property rights is
exacerbated by the multiple regulations concerning the use and
116. See Teitz, Moving Into Cyberspace, supra note 30, at 491-42; Yahoo!,
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(N.D.Cal. 2001), rev 'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
117. See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 921-23 (D.Or. 1999) (analyzing whether internet contacts with
the forum state constituted sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdic-
tion).
118. Euromarket Designs, Inc. d/b/a Crate & Barrel v. Crate & Barrel
Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828-29 (N.D. Ill. 2000). The parallel English litiga-
tion is Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Peters and Crate & Barrel Ltd., [2000]
E.T.M.R. 1025 (Ch. 1999) (Eng.).
119. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d
Cir. 2003).
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registration of domain names under ICANN.120 ICANN provides
its own mandatory Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) for certain types of claims, generally described as
"cybersquatting" or bad faith hijacking of a domain name.121 Al-
though ICANN and its authorized dispute resolution providers are
not part of a court system, the UDRP procedure is yet another
body where there is the potential for parallel and inconsistent pro-
ceedings. This is especially true since the United States enacted
its own independent statute concerning cybersquatting, the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),122 which pro-
vides for federal court subject matter jurisdiction 23 and
damages.124 Since a court is not bound by any ICANN determina-
tion,125 there is the distinct possibility of having two inconsistent
results: "Unlike traditional binding arbitration proceedings,
UDRP proceedings are structured specifically to permit the do-
main-name registrant two bites at the apple." 126 The result of the
ICANN process is generally self-executing in that the domain
name is transferred. On the other hand, the U.S. case law that is
developing in connection with domain name registration is that it
is a "res," located at the place of registration which in the United
States has generally been Virginia. 127 Thus two different "sover-
120. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
at http://www.icann.org (last visited October 5, 2004).
121. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited October 5, 2004). This
policy does not apply to all types of domain names, especially those in the
country code level. For a study of the types of dispute resolution used by some
levels, see Questionnaire on Member States' Experiences with ccTLDs, at
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/comO2/surveys-cctld.html (last visited
October 5, 2004). For example, ".co.U.K." uses a process administered by
Nominet that differs from the ICANN process. See Nominet.u.k., About the
Dispute Reolution Service, at http:ll www.nominet.org.U.K./
DisputeResolution/AboutTheDrs/ (last visited October 5, 2004).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2004) [hereinafter ACPA].
123. Id. § 1121.
124. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(d).
125. UDRP, supra note 121, 4(k) ("The mandatory administrative pro-
ceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent.., the com-
plainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for
independent resolution....").
126. Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 381 (2d Cir. 2003).
127. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Bar-
celona, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding jurisdiction proper in Virginia
because the plaintiffs domain name was registered in that state); America
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eigns," two different standards, two different remedies and two
different results raise issues of parallel proceedings. 128
A recent lower court case out of the Fourth Circuit, Global-
SantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantefe.com,'129 illustrates the extent of the
multiple proceedings possible within the context of cybersquatting
- actions in Virginia, ICANN, and a Korean court. More signifi-
cantly, the case also raises conflicting determinations of adjudica-
tive jurisdiction - in this case in rem jurisdiction, which exists
over the domain name itself through the location of the registry.
The case involved an action against the domain holder of "global-
santefe.com," a Korean entity who registered the domain name
with a Korean registrar, Hangsang, on September 4, 2001.130 Less
than one day earlier, Global Marine Inc. and Santa Fe Interna-
tional Corp., trademark holders of their individual names, an-
nounced a planned merger to be known as GlobalSantaFe Corp.
These U.S. corporations subsequently filed suit under the ACPA,
claiming that the registration by the Korean registrar, Hangsang
Systems, Inc., infringed their domain name and sought to have
the domain name transferred to them. The sole basis for jurisdic-
tion was statutory under the ACPA for in rem jurisdiction over the
domain name.13 1 VeriSign, Global Registry Services - the registry
for top-level ".com" domain names - is based in Virginia. In fact,
the implications of in rem jurisdiction are noted by the court when
it suggests that U.S. courts could eventually have no basis for ju-
risdiction or no ability to cancel registration of a domain name if
the registries are not in the United States.132 In this case, Hang-
Online, Inc. v. Aol.Org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451 (E.D. Va. 2003) (finding in
rem jurisdiction was proper because the domain name registry was located in
that district); cf. Globalsantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d
610, 615 (E.D.Va. 2003) (directing that in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA is
appropriate only if there is no personal jurisdiction in any other district).
128. Courts in the Third and Fourth Circuits have explicitly refused to be
bound by UDRP determinations. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc., 330 F.3d at
626 ( giving no deference to an UDRP decision); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d
365, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2003) (making a de novo review).
129. 250 F. Supp .2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
130. The original registration was by Jongsun Park who transferred it to
Fanmore Corp., whose contact was Jong Ha Park. Id. at 613.
131. Id. at 617 n.16.
132. Id. at 623-24. The court elaborated:
The current ability to assert jurisdiction over a large number of do-
main names in this district pursuant to the ACPA hinges on two fac-
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sang tendered to the court the domain name on December 20,
2001. Ultimately, the now merged trademark holders obtained a
default judgment under the ACPA and an order to Verisign to
transfer the domain name to them.
The domain name holder, Park, not accepting the jurisdiction
of the Virginia federal court over the domain name, filed an appli-
cation in Korea to enjoin Hangsang from transferring the domain
name under the U.S. court order. Several months later, on Sep-
tember 17, 2002, the Korean court granted the injunction, finding
that the Virginia federal court did not have jurisdiction.133 Like
many parallel proceedings, the actions are often the result of dif-
fering notions of the scope of personal jurisdiction. And like many
parallel proceedings, the result is two conflicting orders - in this
case, one from the Korean court ordering the Korean registrar,
Hangsang, not to transfer the domain name, and one from the
U.S. court, ordering the Registry, VeriSign, to cancel the domain
name. Thus the Registry found itself facing conflicting orders.
Unlike many of the contemporary parallel proceedings sagas,
the U.S. district court's opinion considers the international comity
implications and issues of abstaining or deferring to the Korean
action. The court relies on the Princess Lida doctrine, a doctrine
derived from a 1939 Supreme Court case. 34 Like many wholly
domestic precedents, it has been expanded to cover domestic and
foreign litigation, establishing a straight "first in time" rule for ju-
risdiction over the "res." Unfortunately, the court's discussion of
the application of the first in time rule and the Korean court's de-
cision illustrates the fundamental differences in the bases for ju-
risdiction. The question in part is whether jurisdiction over the
domain name should be determined by where the registrar is or
where the registry is, and where the "res" or domain name is lo-
tors, (i) the location of VeriSign within this district and (ii) the cur-
rent popularity of the ".com" and ".net" top-level domain names. ...
[A] desire to avoid United States jurisdiction may cause foreign reg-
istrants to choose to use domain names within their respective coun-
try code top-level domains, whose registries are located in and
operated by the foreign countries .... The result may be an increas-
ing number of domain names registered out of reach of United States
jurisdiction ....
Id.
133. Id.
134. Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
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cated. 135 In fact, the case is an example of the attempts to expand
traditional notions of "property" and personal jurisdiction to cover
intangibles located in cyberspace. Here, since the trademark hold-
ers had won the race for the res (domain name), the court decides
it would be inappropriate to recognize the foreign court order.136
The court then gives lipservice to an obligation to consider "the
important question of comity among nations."137 Ultimately, the
court decides comity is not required because (1) it only applies to
"current" proceedings and the proceedings are not current as
judgment has entered; (2) the Korean action was deliberately de-
signed to block the U.S. action; and (3) the forum has a significant
interest in protecting its own trademark holder's rights. 38 In the
end, the court's strongest argument for refusing to abstain is "that
Judgment supports significant public policies under United States
law"' 39 of trademark, and after all, the U.S. court had jurisdiction
first - at least under U.S. jurisdiction theories. It is clear that
there is a distinct possibility of conflicting results today, and this
is even more likely to occur as more country codes are opened up
and more registrars are involved in more countries.' 40
Because of the nature of the internet, parallel proceedings are
also likely in the future to include consumers who may or may not
also be acting as small business enterprises. The role of consumers
and the different mandatory law applicable to them was one of the
significant stumbling blocks to the negotiations of a comprehen-
sive worldwide treaty on jurisdiction and enforcement of judg-
ments at the Hague,' 4 ' and continues to create issues for aspects
135. GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 625 n.42.
136. Id. at 625 (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d
602, 611-12 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
137. Id. at 626.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The most recent addition to providers is the Asian Domain Name Dis-
pute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC) which was approved on February 28,
2002. ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-
Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm
(last visited Oct. 8, 2004). ICANN also states that the UDRP has been
adopted by the following registrars: ".aero," ".biz," ".com," ".coop," ".info,"
".museum," ".name," ".net," and ".org" top-level domains. ICANN, Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/ (last
visited Oct. 8, 2004).
141. See Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 17, supra note 22; see generally
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of the smaller choice of court convention. 142 Many of the small
business issues are intertwined with intellectual property con-
cerns and arise in connection with the scope of coverage of the
convention. Small business and nonprofit organizations - as users
of licenses and other forms of intellectual property - often within
the context of the internet are concerned with jurisdiction and en-
forcement of judgments, but frequently only as a result of their re-
sistance to underlying substantive law issues, such as validity of
non-negotiated contracts made online. 143 Thus often the stumbling
blocks to enforcement are also the causes of parallel proceedings.
(2) Speech Regulation
Conflicting regulations of commercial activities and speech
are clearly leading to parallel litigation as evidenced by Yahoo!,
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,'" which is
illustrative of this new wave of parallel litigation that involves the
regulation of conduct occurring on the internet. Cases such as
Yahoo, Gutnick,'145 and Harrods146 reflect the uncertain reach of
prescriptive jurisdiction in cyberspace. Of the three cases, Yahoo
is both the best-known and the most problematic. The Yahoo re-
verse declaratory judgment suit in federal court in California
starkly pitted French anti-Nazi speech regulation against U.S.
INTERNET, WHICH COURT DECIDES? WHICH LAW APPLIES? PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN HONOUR OF MICHEL PELICHET (Katharina Bo-
ele-Woelki & Catherine Kessedjian eds., 1998) [hereinafter INTERNET, WHICH
COURT DECIDES?]; WHO RULES THE NET? A NEW GUIDE TO NAVIGATING THE
PROPOSED RULES OF THE ROAD FOR CYBERSPACE (Adam Thierer & Clyde
Wayne Crews, eds., 2003).
142. See Stratton Shartel, Hague Delegates Find Consensus, Narrow Dis-
putes, as Diplomatic Conference Nears, 9 ELEC. COMMERCE AND LAW REP. 450
(May 12, 2004); Stratton Shartel, Hague Delegates Revise Choice of Court
Convention, but Some Concerns Remain, 8 ELEC. COMMERCE AND LAW REP.
1134 (December 17, 2003).
143. See INTERNET, WHICH COURT DECIDES?, supra note 141, at 80-81;
Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 17, supra note 22, at 8.
144. Yahoo!, Inc. v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemetisme, 169
F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
145. Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., (2001) V.S.C. 305, appeal dismissed,
Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.).
146. Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), aff'd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003). The parallel English litigation is
Harrods Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., [2003] EWHC 1162 (Eng. 2003).
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First Amendment protections.1 47 Although the underlying sub-
stantive issue has been addressed within the context of enforcing
foreign defamation judgments,148 the addition of the criminal
sanction 149 and the use of cyberspace raise new issues, including
the ability to block access within the limits of new technology.
The first Yahoo suit was filed in Paris' 50 by two groups - the
Union of Jewish Students and LICRA, the International League
against Racism and Antisemitism - seeking to enforce French
laws that forbade the sale of Nazi-related goods, in this case
through Yahoo's U.S.-based portal.' 5 ' In addition, they sought to
compel Yahoo to pay penalties for violating the French Penal Code
in the amount of 100,000 Francs per day for every day that Yahoo
continued to violate the law.' 52 In May 2000 the French court re-
quired Yahoo to block French users from accessing the Nazi-
related goods on the U.S. website, Yahoo.com, and found that the
selling or displaying of Nazi material "was a threat to the public
order."' 53 The Paris court appointed a panel of experts to deter-
mine the validity of Yahoo's claim that it was not feasible techno-
147. See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93.
148. See, e.g., Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995)
(mem.) (applying Maryland Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition
Act); Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515, 1994 WL
419847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (mem.); Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992); see generally TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 271-73.
149. A French court indicated that it would bring criminal actions against
Yahoo and its former president, with an initial trial date set for May 7, 2002.
League Against Racism & Antisemitism - LICRA & Yahoo! Inc., T.G.I., Paris,
20 Nov. 2000, Interim Order No. RG: 00/05308, 4 [hereinafter LICRA], trans-
lation available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/
001120yahoofrance.pdf. If found guilty, the former president could have been
sentenced to up to five years in prison as well as fined. On February 11,
2003, the charges were dropped. Kerry Shaw, French Court Rejects Suit
Against Yahoo, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at C9.
150. LICRA, supra note 149. The initial injunction was issued on 22 May
2000. Id. at 2.
151. Id. at 4. (stating that "the simple act of displaying such objects in
France constitutes a violation of Article R645-1 of the Penal Code and there-
fore a threat to the public order.").
152. Id. at 20.
153. Id. at 2-4. Yahoo! Inc., a California-based corporation, has a French
subsidiary, Yahoo France, that operates a server in France but has not vio-
lated the French penal code since it does not display links to Nazi-related
web sites. Id. at 18-20.
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logically or financially to block French users from its servers in
the United States. In November 2000, the Paris court, relying on
the reports of some of the experts, upheld the determination that
Yahoo must comply within three months of the order or face fines
of 100,000 Francs per day.154
In response to the Paris suit, Yahoo filed a second suit in fed-
eral court in San Jose, California, seeking a declaratory judgment
that the French judgment was not enforceable in the United
States and that the French court lacked jurisdiction to control Ya-
hoo's U.S.-based website. 155 Since Yahoo had no significant assets
in France, any attempt to enforce the French fines would probably
require an action in the United States where Yahoo had assets.
The district court ultimately determined that it had personal ju-
risdiction over the defendants, that the controversy was not moot
and that the possibility of enforcement was real.156 The district
court went to great pains to stress what it viewed as the purpose
of the U.S. action: "Rather, the purpose of the present action is to
determine whether a United States court may enforce the French
order without running afoul of the First Amendment.... [A]
United States court is best situated to determine the application
of the United States Constitution."157 Rejecting the defendants'
request for abstention, the district court granted summary judg-
ment for Yahoo and found that enforcing the judgment would be
inconsistent with the First Amendment. In so doing, it relied
heavily on earlier cases refusing to enforce British libel judg-
ments. 5 8 The court indicated that this holding applied even if Ya-
hoo had the technological ability to block access as required by the
French court. In passing, the court suggested that the constitu-
154. Id. at 20.
155. The complaint in the United States, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Racisme et LAntisemetisme, COO-21275 PVT ADR (N.D. Cal. December 21,
2000) is available at www.cdt.orgtspeech/international]
001221yahoocomplaint.pdf. The case is also discussed in Mylene Mangalin-
dan & Kevin Delaney, Yahoo! Ordered to Bar the French From Nazi Items,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2000, at B1. The suit also sought an injunction to pre-
vent French Anti-Semitism advocacy groups from trying to enforce the
French judgment in the United States. Yahoo! Inc., C00-21275 PVT ADR at
12, 13.
156. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemetisme, 169
F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
157. Id. at 1191-92.
158. Id. at 1192-93.
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tional protection of speech might trump any treaty or convention
in connection with speech that originated in the United States. 159
The Ninth Circuit, after more than a year and a half of delib-
erations, reversed the District Court's decision. 160 The court held
that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the French defen-
dants.' 6' By deciding the case on personal jurisdiction grounds,
the court left open many questions regarding the regulation of the
internet. In the interim, the French court dismissed the criminal
charges that had been filed against Yahoo and its former CEO.162
Yahoo has since instituted policies restricting content that is
"hateful or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable," and
also requiring compliance with all applicable foreign laws. 63
Who regulates conduct in cyberspace and what happens in the
realm of concurrent jurisdiction are far from settled. While there
may be no international judgments convention in place as yet,64
for the multinational corporation the Yahoo litigation is but a
harbinger of what is to come when the local laws conflict with U.S.
values and policies. A significant part of the litigation will turn on
who controls the cyberspace in which the conduct is occurring.
Electronic commerce that travels across the unmarked boundaries
of cyberspace has generated high profile disputes as multiple ju-
risdictions try to regulate and control cyberspace. The attempt to
subject the users of cyberspace to the laws of competing jurisdic-
tions results in inconsistent regulation reflecting different legal
values and cultures, and a friction that was more theoretical than
real in an everyday context ten years ago. Areas such as defama-
tion, intellectual property, and securities law are ripe for friction
among courts. The recent Australian suit against the Dow Jones
159. Id. at 1193 ("Absent a body of law that establishes international
standards with respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or
legislation addressing enforcement of such standards to speech originating
within the United States, the principle of comity is outweighed by the Court's
obligation to uphold the First Amendment.").
160. The case was argued before the Ninth Circuit in December 2002. Ya-
hoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemetisme, 379 F.3d 1120,
1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2004).
161. Id. at 1126-27.
162. The charges were dropped on February 11, 2003. See supra note 149.
163. See Yahoo Terms of Service, No. 6 Member Conduct, at
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (last visited October 8, 2004).
164. See discussion infra Part VII.A.
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for defamation based on the internet publication of an article from
the Wall Street Journal 165 is likely to recur, raising the question of
where a defamation actually occurs and whether an internet pub-
lisher is liable wherever an article can be downloaded or accessed.
The amount of parallel litigation generated by issues of concurrent
prescriptive jurisdiction is likely to increase exponentially, espe-
cially in cyberspace and areas where there is a lack of consensus
on underlying substantive law and value, unless jurisdiction can
be limited by the effects doctrine, targeting and disclaimers? 66
B. Forum Selection Clauses
A second trend in parallel proceedings that has continued to
emerge is the number of cases that involve proceedings outside of
or contrary to a choice of court or choice of forum clause. Some-
times the alternative forum is an arbitral tribunal. Many of the
cases raise questions of interpretation and scope of the clauses,
especially in connection with multiple parties who may not be part
of the underlying contractual transaction. Chosen courts may be
asked to restrain parties from continuing other proceedings; non-
designated courts may be asked to stay actions in deference to the
designated forum. The trouble arises when the two courts involved
disagree in interpretation, scope, or validity of the forum selection
clause. The new Hague Conference Draft Choice of Court conven-
tion seeks to reduce some of this parallel litigation, as discussed in
Part VII. This dilemma of varying interpretations or standards of
substantive validity is one inherent in any transnational dispute
on choice of forum clauses and is one that will need to be ad-
dressed in any Hague Conference Choice of Court convention. 167
165. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.) (af-
firming lower court's decision that the statements the plaintiff (Gutnick)
complained of were published in Victoria when downloaded by the Dow Jones
subscribers, therefore the defamation occurred in Victoria and Victoria was
not an inappropriate forum).
166. The effects doctrine has been used recently in domestic internet
defamation cases, especially by the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., Young v. New
Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that to assert ju-
risdiction for a web site posting, the plaintiff must show an intent to target
and focus on a certain group of readers).
167. See discussion infra Part VII.B. A convention on choice of court can
define its own standards of substantive validity, or it can rely on a choice of
law rule for determining validity which in turn may incorporate national law.
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One recent case illustrates the potential for parallel proceed-
ings when different courts disagree about the interpretation or
scope of an arbitration clause. The litigation on both sides of the
Atlantic in the Armco cases 168 snaked its way through the United
States and English courts to a decision by the House of Lords. 169
The final English appellate opinion illustrates the statesmanlike
use of comity to defuse the escalating proceedings, while providing
some protection for the English defendant in the New York forum.
The Armco cases arise out of a management buy-out headed
by Mr. Donohue and Mr. Atkins of a group of English insurance
companies (BNIG) owned by Armco and some of its subsidiaries.
The negotiators for Armco in the buy-out were Mr. Rossi and Mr.
Stinson. Armco alleged that Donohue, Rossi, Stinson, and later
Atkins, "the group of four," conspired to defraud Armco and its
subsidiaries of millions of dollars through a complex scheme that
involved buying the insurance companies through Wingfield, a
New Jersey corporation that allegedly was secretly owned by
Rossi and Stinson, then Armco executives. Armco claimed that as
part of the fraudulent scheme, the group persuaded Armco to in-
ject extra money into the failing English insurance companies and
to sign contracts in connection with the sale that contained Eng-
lish exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Armco brought suit against the
group of four and additional corporate conspirators 70 in the
Southern District of New York to recover funds from the fraudu-
lent scheme, alleging common law fraud, conversion, breach of fi-
duciary duty and RICO violations. Several other suits were filed
against Donohue and others in Hong Kong, New Jersey and Sin-
gapore. Some of the defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of
168. The U.S. proceeding is Armco, Inc. v. North At. Ins. Co. Ltd., 68 F.
Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y 1999). The English proceedings are under the name
Donohue v. Armco Inc. The lower court opinion is reported at [1999] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 649 (Q.B. 1999) (Aikens, J., dismissing application for an antisuit in-
junction). The Court of Appeals decision is reported at [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
579 (C.A. 2000) (granting the antisuit injunction).
169. The House of Lords decision is reported at [2001] U.K.H.L. 64 (H.L.
2001), [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 425.
170. The cases in both the United States and England involved multiple
parties, both individual and corporate, some of whom were not made parties
to the exclusive jurisdiction clauses or contracts and some of whom were
named in one claim or one forum and not another. This summary attempts to
simplify the complex facts and focus on the underlying suit/antisuit injunc-
tion. See Armco, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
2004]
42 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.10:1
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and forum non conveniens.
The defendants specifically challenged the filing of suit in breach
of the English exclusive jurisdiction clauses contained in the
transfer and sale agreements. 171
In the subsequent English proceedings, Donohue sought to
enjoin the U.S. litigation as vexatious and oppressive as evidenced
by its being in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Rossi,
Stinson, and several of the related corporate entities created for
the sale and purchase, including Wingfield, applied to join as "co-
claimants" in the English antisuit proceedings. They are referred
to by the English appellate courts as "PCCs." The English trial
court found that the exclusive jurisdiction clauses, although valid,
only bound some of the parties and that the claims in the New
York lawsuit were based on a pre-existing conspiracy, and there-
fore did not arise out of the contracts and were largely outside the
exclusive jurisdiction clauses. 172 The court also found that the pro-
ceedings against Donohue in New York were neither vexatious nor
oppressive, England was not the "natural forum" for the litigation
and the other co-claimants also were not entitled to an injunc-
tion. 173 The English parties, defendants in the United States, ap-
pealed the denial of the antisuit injunction in England.174
In the interim, the District Judge in the New York federal
court proceeding denied the motions to dismiss based on personal
jurisdiction, improper venue, and forum non conveniens. The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that exclusive jurisdiction clauses did
not cover the pending litigation and were unenforceable because
171. The only parties to the three agreements at issue on the Armco side
were AFSIL, AFSEL, and AFSC, with Armco Inc. succeeding to the rights
and obligations of AFSEL (two other members of the Armco group, APL and
NNIC, were not parties). Similarly, on the Donohue side, CISHL, Wingfield,
Mr. Donohue, and Mr. Atkins were the only parties to the agreements, mean-
ing that Mr. Rossi and Mr. Stinson and their companies were not parties to
the agreements or to the exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Donohue, [2001]
U.K.H.L. 64 at 7.
172. Donohue, [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 664-65.
173. Id. at 664.
174. The courts on both sides of the Atlantic also spent significant time
discussing the interrelationship of both the Armco conglomerate of companies
and the individual and corporate defendants, particularly in connection with
which parties were signatories to contracts and which were bound by the ex-
clusive jurisdiction clauses. This analysis was also relevant in proceedings in
both New York and London to the question of duplication of litigation.
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induced by fraud. In denying the forum non conveniens motion,
the district court relied specifically on the intervening English
trial court opinion to demonstrate that the United States had a
greater interest in the action.175
The next stage for the proceedings was back in England be-
fore the Court of Appeal, which reversed the lower trial court and
issued an antisuit injunction against the Armco entities from pro-
ceeding in New York.176 Besides Donohue individually there were
the PCCs (two individuals and four corporations). The PCCs,
hanging on Donohue's coattails, were also ultimately granted an
injunction. Even though all but one were not parties to any exclu-
sive jurisdiction clause, they were considered necessary and
proper parties for the English proceedings. The Court of Appeal
injunction included these parties "to give effect to the exclusive ju-
risdiction clauses and to ensure trial in England of the issues aris-
ing out of or connected with the management buy-out between all
the parties involved."177 The court determined that the New York
proceedings were within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction
clause. Contrary to the lower court's approach of looking at the
most appropriate place for the litigation, when there is an exclu-
sive jurisdiction clause there has to be a strong reason not to grant
an antisuit injunction since it is considered "prima facie oppres-
sive and vexatious to litigate elsewhere than in the agreed fo-
rum."
1 78
The final act of this litigation was in the House of Lords which
reversed the Court of Appeal. The Lords first reviewed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeal to include in the antisuit injunction not
only Mr. Donohue, but the PCCs who had not been party to the
exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The Lords clarified the principles
controlling the grant of an injunction as established in other case
law that an injunction is only available when justice requires, and
will only restrain vexatious or oppressive foreign litigation. In ad-
175. Armco, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 341 ("Although trial in England would be an
adequate alternative forum, the court concludes that the relevant private and
public factors indicate that litigating this case in the United States is com-
pletely appropriate.").
176. Donohue v. Armco Inc., [20001 1 Lloyd's Rep. 579, 594 (C.A. 2000).
177. Donohue v. Armco Inc., [2001] U.K.H.L. 64, T 15 (H.L. 2001), [2002] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 425, 430.
178. Donohue, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 589.
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dition, the foreign forum must not be the natural home for the liti-
gation. The court also must look to see what injustices there might
be to both parties, including whether the defendant (here the
plaintiff in the foreign action) will be deprived of advantages in
the foreign forum to which he is entitled. Applying these princi-
ples, the House of Lords found that England was not the natural
forum for the proceedings, and as to these defendants, the New
York litigation was neither vexatious nor oppressive. 179
The House of Lords then addressed the grant of the antisuit
injunction as to Donohue alone and the case law controlling the
discretion to enforce exclusive jurisdiction clauses either through
staying or restraining:
[Wihere parties have bound themselves by an exclusive
jurisdiction clause effect should ordinarily be given to
that obligation in the absence of strong reasons for de-
parting from it. Whether a party can show strong rea-
sons, sufficient to displace the other party's prima facie
entitlement to enforce the contractual bargain, will de-
pend on all the facts and circumstances of the particular
case. 180
After reviewing numerous cases that involved multiple parties
and claims that were outside exclusive jurisdiction clauses, cou-
pled with the emphasis on avoiding inconsistent judgments, the
House of Lords turned to specific facts. Donohue had the right as
to the Armco entities with whom he had exclusive jurisdiction
clauses to expect not to be sued in New York, and even more criti-
cally, not to be subject to RICO claims that would be possible in
New York but not in England. The other PCCs, however, were fair
game for the Armco entities to pursue "any claim they choose in
any convenient forum where they can found jurisdiction," includ-
ing New York.18' Similarly, some of the Armco entities not bound
by the exclusive jurisdiction clauses could pursue Donohue where
179. Donohue, [2001] U.K.H.L. 64 at 20. In addition, the House of Lords
considered "another more technical objection" that of jurisdiction, and decides
that "[ilt would be wrong in principle to allow these PCCs to use Mr.
Donohue's action as a Trojan horse in which to enter the proceedings when
they could have shown no possible ground for doing so in their own right." Id.
at 21.
180. Id. at 24.
181. Id.
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he could be found, and the Armco entities bound could pursue him
on claims outside the exclusive jurisdiction clauses - all of which
appear to have found jurisdiction in New York and could proceed
even if an antisuit injunction were issued.
The House of Lords denied the injunction but added a condi-
tion that Mr. Donohue may not be sued for RICO claims or "mul-
tiple or punitive damages," and that Mr. Donohue could claim that
the sale and purchase agreement was governed by English law:182
I am driven to conclude that great weight should be given
to it .... [T]he interests of justice are best served by the
submission of the whole dispute to a single tribunal
which is best fitted to make a reliable, comprehensive
judgment on all matters in issue. A procedure which
permitted the possibility of different conclusions by dif-
ferent tribunals, perhaps made on different evidence,
would in my view run directly counter to the interests of
justice. 83
Thus, the House of Lords allows the goal of "submission of the
whole dispute to a single tribunal" for "a comprehensive judg-
ment" in the interests of justice to override enforcement of an ex-
clusive jurisdiction clause, at least when there are multiple
parties and claims that are appropriately litigated in a foreign fo-
rum.'8 4 The result encourages courts to avoid granting antisuit in-
junctions which will simply result in encouraging conflicting
judgments, but also counsels courts to attempt to shape some
compromise where possible to protect the contractual expectations
of parties.
In contrast to the balanced approach of the House of Lords in
the Armco litigation, the Seventh Circuit in AAR International,
Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A. 185 again demonstrated its resistance
to "comity" by reversing the lower court's abstention order and en-
forcing a "permissive forum selection clause." 8 6 The District Court
182. Id. at 36. The actual undertaking includes two other entities, Wing-
field and CISHL. Id. at 31-32.
183. Id. at 34.
184. Id.
185. 250 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2001).
186. Id. at 525-27. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., 10
F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993); see discussion supra Part III.
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had granted a motion to abstain in favor of two, possibly three,
proceedings in Greece concerning the lease of an airplane and
dismissed the U.S. reverse image case. 187 Following the Colorado
River 88 and Moses Cone'89 domestic precedents of abstention "for
wise judicial administration," the lower court applied a "laundry
list of factors,"190 but put heavy weight on the repetitive nature of
the actions and the satisfactory alternative forum in Greece.19'
The Seventh Circuit unfortunately turned first to domestic
precedent, even though the cases involved foreign litigation as
well. 192 The court disagreed with the lower court's determination
that the U.S. and Greek actions were parallel and that the Greek
actions would likely dispose of the claims in the U.S. action. By
reading the requirement of Moses Cone to mean it would be a "se-
rious abuse of discretion" if there is any doubt as to the actions be-
ing parallel, the Seventh Circuit found a basis to reverse. 193 The
appellate court decided that the lower court improperly balanced
the abstention factors. 194 The Seventh Circuit found that the lower
court put "undue weight on the inconvenience of the federal forum
for the [Greek] appellees, and did not adequately consider the in-
187. AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A., 100 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878
(N.D. Ill. 2000).
188. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976).
189. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983).
190. AAR Int'l, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 878. The District Court stated:
The Seventh Circuit directs me to consider a laundry list of factors:(1) the identity of the court that first assumed jurisdiction over the
property; (2) the relative inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the
need to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the respec-
tive proceedings were filed; (5) whether federal or foreign law pro-
vides the rule of decision; (6) whether the foreign action protects the
federal plaintiffs rights; (7) the relative progress of the federal and
foreign proceedings; and (8) the vexatious or contrived nature of the
federal claim.
Id. (citing Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d
896, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of the lower court opinion in Fi-
nova, see Teitz, Treading Carefully, supra note 72, at 404-05.
191. AAR Int'l, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 878 ("ITihe most economical use of
my time is to let the Greek courts handle it.").
192. Id. at 517-18.
193. Id. at 520.
194. Id. at 522-23.
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convenience of the Greek forum for AAR." 195 The Circuit further
found that the district court did not weigh properly the non-
exclusive Illinois jurisdiction clause and the irrevocable waiver of
objection to Illinois as an inconvenient forum contained in the
lease, and thus there was a basis for reversal even under the
abuse of discretion standard. 196 This clause then is a heavy weight
in the Seventh Circuit's eyes in refusing to abstain in the face of
parallel litigation, such that AAR ultimately appears to receive
from this non-exclusive clause the benefits that would otherwise
be accorded only to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.
Cases like Armco and AAR that result from differences in the
interpretation and enforcement of forum selection clauses serve to
highlight the need for the multilateral choice of court convention
currently being negotiated in The Hague. 197 The convention would
enforce forum selection clauses much the way the New York Con-
vention 98 assures that agreements to arbitrate are enforceable.
Even when parties attempt to pre-ordain the location of later dis-
putes in transnational transactions, the inability to enforce that
agreement without litigation nullifies the value of a choice of fo-
rum clause and removes the predictability and allocation of costs
for which the parties bargained. A convention that enforces exclu-
sive choice of court clauses as well as the resulting judgments will
go a long way toward providing some certainty and encouraging
consensual choice of forum in global business.
V. EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING COMMON-LAW THEORIES
OF PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
During the last several years, there have been several cases
in Europe that have involved issues of parallel proceedings. Four
recent cases before the European Court of Justice reflect the
problems arising from increased judicial cooperation under the
Brussels Regulation. Specifically, the difficulty arises from
attempts to integrate the common-law doctrines of antisuit
195. Id. at 522.
196. Id. at 523.
197. See discussion infra Part VII.
198. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (codified at
9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 208 (2004)) [hereinafter New York Convention].
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injunctions and forum non conveniens into European law. 199 Both
the Brussels Regulation and its predecessor Brussels Convention
contain lis pendens provisions which come into effect when the
first court of a member state is seised; any other member state's
courts must stay proceedings "until such time as the jurisdiction
of the court first seised is established."200
This strict "first in time" approach under the Brussels Con-
vention was challenged and upheld in a case decided in 2003 by
the European Court of Justice when one of the parties filed suit
contrary to a choice of court clause and in a country where the le-
gal proceedings were exceptionally slow. In Erich Gasser GmbH v.
MISAT Srl,201 an Austrian clothing company sold clothes to an
Italian company, with invoices having an exclusive choice of juris-
diction clause for an Austrian court. Following a dispute between
the parties, the Italian buyer brought suit in Rome, seeking a dec-
laration that the contract had been terminated and also seeking
damages. The seller subsequently brought suit in Austria under
the forum selection clause for payment on the outstanding in-
voices. The Austrian court, on its own motion, stayed proceedings
under the then Brussels Convention Article 21.202 Reference was
made to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a ruling whether
the Austrian court had to stay all proceedings until the court first
seised had declared it had no jurisdiction under Article 21 because
of the exclusive Austrian choice of court clause.2 3 Gasser and the
U.K. government argued that choice of court clauses should be
"encouraged" since they "contribute to legal certainty in commer-
cial relationships."2 4
The reasons given in part by the ECJ for rejecting these ar-
guments focus on the need to avoid the possibility of irreconcilable
judgments at all costs between the courts of member states and
199. For a discussion of antisuit injunctions and the Brussels Conven-
tion/Regulation, see Ambrose, supra note 13.
200. Brussels Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 27.
201. Case C-116/02, [2003] ECR __ (9 Dec. 2003).
202. Id. at 15; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 12, at art. 21.
203. Eric Gasser, [2003] ECR _ at 19.
204. Id. at 31. The U.K. had proposed to avoid the risk of irreconcilable
judgments the court first seised "whose jurisdiction is contested in reliance on
an agreement conferring jurisdiction must stay proceedings until the court
which is designated by that agreement, and is the court second seised, has
given a decision on its own jurisdiction." Id. at 33.
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the "legal certainty sought by the Convention."2 5 The ECJ also re-
jected the arguments of the U.K. government about the potential
for abuse through filing in the wrong forum to delay the proceed-
ings. Indeed in this case, proceedings in the derogated court, Italy,
take "excessively long."20 6 Gasser argued that in such a case, the
courts of the State second seised should be entitled to rule on the
question of jurisdiction rather than wait for the nonchosen but
first seised court to rule that it has no jurisdiction. The ECJ in-
sisted on a very literal reading of Article 21:
68. It is not compatible with the philosophy and the objec-
tives of the Brussels Convention for national courts to be
under an obligation to respect rules on lis pendens only if
they consider that the court first seised will give judg-
ment within a reasonable period.
72. Second, it must be borne in mind that the Brussels
Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the
Contracting States accord to each other's legal systems
and judicial institutions... It is also common ground that
the Convention thereby seeks to ensure legal certainty by
allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty
which court will have jurisdiction.20 7
Gasser suggests the potential for abuse by deliberately stall-
ing litigation in violation of a choice of court clause. Contrary to
the ECJ's laudatory comments about certainty, Gasser has the po-
tential to nullify the value of an exclusive choice of court clause,
making certainty the captive of procedural maneuvers. In the end,
the fastest runner to the courthouse may triumph over party
autonomy and contractual choice.
The ECJ also considered the implications for European law of
parallel proceedings in two member states when one state is a
common-law jurisdiction. This time the question in Turner v.
Grovit20 8 concerned the use of an antisuit injunction to stop pro-
205. Id. at [ 51.
206. Id. at 33.
207. Id. at 1 68-72.
208. [2002] 1 W.L.R. 107 (H.L. 2001), preliminary reference made, Case C-
159/02, [2003] ECR -, [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 216,judgment of the full court,
[2004] ECR 00 (27 Apr. 2004), [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 169; see Hartley, How to
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ceedings filed or threatened to be filed in another member state
that constituted an abuse of process, when the defendants were
alleged to be acting "in bad faith with the intent and purpose of
frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly before the English
courts."20 9 The case highlights fundamental differences in the
treatment of parallel proceedings in certain circumstances in
common-law countries and civil law countries. Turner, a British
national, went to work in Spain. Following an employment dis-
pute, he asked to terminate the contract and returned to London
where he brought an action for a form of unfair dismissal in the
Employment Tribunal, London. Meanwhile, the employer had in-
stituted proceedings in Spain seeking damages against Turner.
Turner then asked the English High Court to issue an antisuit in-
junction against the defendants from continuing the proceedings
in Spain. The English court issued the injunction for a short pe-
riod of time but refused to renew the order. 210 Turner then sought
and received an injunction from the English Court of Appeal
which viewed the proceedings in Spain as being for the sole pur-
pose of intimidating Turner, and therefore an abuse of process,
warranting injunctive relief.211 The House of Lords referred the
matter to the ECJ in December 2001 to determine if the antisuit
injunction was inconsistent with the Brussels Convention.212 The
defendants, as well as the German and Italian governments,
urged that the antisuit injunction was irreconcilable with the
Brussels Convention.
The Advocate General's preliminary opinion 213 determined
that the Convention "must be interpreted as precluding the judi-
cial authorities of a Contracting State from issuing orders to liti-
gants restraining them from commencing or continuing
proceedings before judicial authorities of other Contracting
States."21 4 In reaching this result that reinforced the lis pendens
provisions in the Brussels Convention in favor of the court first
Abuse the Law, supra note 13.
209. Id. at 18.
210. Id. at 11.
211. Id. at 12.
212. Id. at 18.
213. The Advocate General issued an opinion on 20 November 2003. Case
C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, [2003] ECR __ (20 Nov. 2003), [2004] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 216.
214. Id. at 38.
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
seised, the Advocate General made reference to case law in other
common-law jurisdictions, including the United States, and sug-
gested that the Convention's structure did not allow for antisuit
injunctions:
30. The arguments against compatibility with the Con-
vention put forward in the course of these preliminary
proceedings stem from the idea that one of the pillars of
the international instrument is the reciprocal trust estab-
lished between the various national legal systems, upon
which the English restraining orders would seem to cast
doubt.
31. That view seems to me to be decisive. [ European ju-
dicial cooperation, in which the Convention represents an
important landmark, is imbued with the concept of mu-
tual trust, which presupposes that each State recognizes
the capacity of the other legal systems to contribute inde-
pendently, but harmoniously, to the stated objectives of
integration. 215
The ECJ, following this approach in its final opinion issued on
April 27, 2004, left no room for national law to continue, at least
where the proceedings are in two member states. 216 This result of
a strong lis pendens when both parties are nationals of the com-
munity, along with Gasser, increases the pressure to be the first to
file. The decision also encourages vexations filings to wrest juris-
diction away from the otherwise natural forum.
Owusu v. Jackson217 raises the next question: What about
when parties are from third countries, not members of the Euro-
pean Union? Is forum non conveniens still viable under the Brus-
sels regime? Owusu also introduces the issue of multiple parties
since only one of the defendants is from a member state and the
other five are domiciled in Jamaica. Mr. Owusu, an English domi-
ciliary, was injured at the beach while on holiday in Jamaica. He
brought suit in tort in England against multiple parties, all but
215. Id. at 30-31.
216. Turner v. Grovit, [2004] ECR 00 (27 Apr. 2004), [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
169 (Judgment of the Full Court).
217. [2002] I.L.Pr. 45 (C.A. 2002), preliminary reference made, Case C-
281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, [2003] ECR _
20041
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one of whom were Jamaican limited liability companies, for failing
to warn of dangers of a submerged sand bank. He also brought
suit for breach of contract against the English company from
whom he rented the villa. The English lower court judge found
that Jamaica was the appropriate forum for the proceedings for
several reasons and, but for the Brussels Convention precluding
staying the action against the one English defendant he would
have done so. 218 Since he could not stay the suit against the Eng-
lish defendant he would not want to stay as to the other defen-
dants because then two different courts, one in England and one
in Jamaica, would try the same factual issues and might reach
conflicting results and thus conflicting judgments. To avoid the
parallel litigation, he refused to stay any of the proceedings in
London.
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal which sub-
sequently made a reference to the ECJ based on the mandatory
requirements of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention requiring
suit in the domicile of a defendant from a member state.219 This is
contrary to the national law which allowed the exercise of discre-
tionary power in the form of forum non conveniens when the par-
ties were from non-contracting states and the potential parallel
litigation did not involve another member state. The English
court, in referring the matter to the ECJ, recognized that the issue
of forum non conveniens and the relationship to mandatory provi-
sions of the Brussels Convention/Regulation as applied to defen-
dants from nonmember states inherently raises the potential of
parallel proceedings and the issue of what response is permissible,
at least when courts of third countries are involved. 220 The ECJ
218. Id. at $ 20.
219. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, [2003] ECR__
220. Id. at 1 59-63. The Court of Appeal noted:
45. The present case is concerned with the doctrine of forum conven-
iens, when applied as between a member state and a non-member
state. But it might just as easily have been concerned with the doc-
trine of lis alibi pendens, or "prorogation of jurisdiction,".., or any
of the other situations for which the Brussels Convention provides
discretionary or mandatory exceptions .... If article 2 is mandatory,
then a defendant domiciled in England must be sued in England in
all such cases even if the Convention would allow or require the ac-
tion to be brought in the courts of another member state if a domi-
ciliary of another member state was involved.
Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
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has yet to act in Owusu but its decision will no doubt affect paral-
lel proceedings issues - either indirectly through forum non con-
veniens dismissals/stays, or directly through lis pendens - for
those actions that involve a member state that, under its national
law, allows discretionary dismissals or antisuit injunctions, such
as the U.K., and a third country.
European law on parallel proceedings is now having a direct
impact on U.S. corporations who have foreign subsidiaries and do
business abroad. In American Motorist Insurance Co. (AMICO) v.
Cellstar Corp.221 the English court's discretion to dismiss was lim-
ited by Convention/Regulation since one of the two defendants was
a U.K. subsidiary of a U.S.-based company. Cellstar, a U.S. corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in Texas, obtained an
insurance policy from AMICO, an Illinois insurance company do-
ing business in Texas. The insurance policy was to cover Cellstar's
global business of providing wireless communication equipment
which it carried out through subsidiaries. The insurance policy for
"global transportation," issued by AMICO's Texas office, was to
cover Cellstar and its subsidiaries worldwide against losses of cell
phones in transit in connection with sales operations in seventeen
countries. The litigation related to a claim for about one million
pounds for a loss in March 2000 for shipments made by Cellstar's
U.K. subsidiary (CUK) to other locations in Europe. 222 After
AMICO denied coverage, demand was made by CUK and Cellstar
in the United States. In response, AMICO filed suit in London a
week later for a negative declaration against CUK and Cellstar.
Cellstar subsequently filed suit in Dallas against AMICO for
wrongful failure to settle the claim, eventually joining other inci-
dents of loss as well. AMICO did not seek to stay the Texas litiga-
tion, which would probably have not been granted, but eventually
joined CUK as a third party in the Texas suit.223
By suing CUK, the U.K. subsidiary, in England, AMICO was
able to get jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention/Regulation
for an insurance policy issued in Texas by a Texas insurer to a
Texas corporation to cover its foreign subsidiaries. In the U.K. liti-
221. American Motorists Ins. Co v. Cellstar Corp., [2003] I.L.Pr. 22 (C.A.
2003).
222. Id. at 2.
223. Id.
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litigation seeking a negative declaration of nonliability, AMICO
tried to have Cellstar joined as a necessary party and claimed that
the worldwide insurance policy was governed by English law. The
lower court in the U.K., after determining that English law would
not govern the insurance policy, found that Texas was therefore
the appropriate forum for the resolution of the dispute and stayed
the action against CUK.224 AMICO argued on appeal that the
lower court was without authority under the Brussels Convention
to exercise discretion and stay the action against CUK. Thus the
court was faced with an issue similar to Owusu, of whether, in
light of the mandatory terms of the Brussels Conven-
tion/Regulation that establish where an English-domiciled corpo-
ration may be sued, an action in a member state can be stayed in
favor of an action in a third country which is the "forum conven-
iens." The appellate court found that the entire insurance policy
was subject to Texas law, and that at a minimum Cellstar should
not be a party to suit in London, but that suit should be in
Texas. 225 The court recommended a reference to the ECJ of the is-
sue of staying the action against CUK in favor of proceedings in
Texas, 226 again raising the issue of whether the discretionary doc-
trine of staying or dismissing parallel litigation that is vexatious
or brought in an inconvenient forum can co-exist under the Brus-
sels Regulation when the alternative forum is a nonmember state.
Although the case is a continent away, the implications of the
ECJ cases are significant for U.S. companies with foreign subsidi-
aries in Europe who may find themselves litigating in several fo-
rums and no longer able to get out of the litigation in Europe.
When one combines the ability to seek negative declaratory ac-
tions with the lis pendens and the loss of the discretionary ability
to dismiss in favor of foreign litigation in the appropriate forum
under the Regulation, one finds the result is multiple proceedings.
Although the insurance contract in AMICO was to cover losses in
Europe and of foreign subsidiaries, Cellstar would not necessarily
anticipate that an insurance policy bought in Texas and from a
Texas insurer would force it or its subsidiary to be sued in the
U.K. if it subsequently had a disputed claim for coverage. The ul-
224. Id. at 4.
225. Id. at 1 48, 50-51.
226. Id. at $1 49, 51.
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timate result is the increased likelihood of having to litigate on
two continents if a corporation has a European subsidiary and is
sued. This at least suggests the possibility of vexatious litigation
whenever a U.S. company is sued in Europe by joining a European
subsidiary or necessary party - much the way a plaintiff in a U.S.
court can avoid removal to federal court in a nonfederal question
case by joining a nondiverse party.227 Cases that an English court
might previously have stayed, now will have to continue if the
ECJ construes the Brussels Regulation narrowly, in keeping with
the Gasser and Turner decisions, to foreclose the operation of na-
tional law when the other litigation is pending in the court of a
third country.
VI. ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE U.S.
Enforcement and recognition of judgments, although chrono-
logically the last concern in litigation, is one of the first considera-
tions in initiating a lawsuit. Indeed the ability to enforce a
judgment and the potential for prejudgment relief may ultimately
control the initial decisions of whether and where to sue. As dis-
cussed earlier, there is no constitutional provision requiring rec-
ognition of foreign judgments, 228 nor any multilateral agreement
to which the United States is a party. Rather, the state or federal
court is free to accord "comity" to the foreign judgment, a concept
frequently cited but rarely explained in any way other than by
227. Perhaps the best known example of this is World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), where the anecdotal basis for joining
Seaway and World-Wide was to keep the defendants from removing to federal
court and out of the more favorable jury pool in the state court.
228. See supra note 15. There is no requirement under the Constitution
for giving full faith and credit to a foreign judgment. Nor does the Full Faith
and Credit Statute control foreign judgments. See U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2004).
The United States does have some Treaties of Friendship with indi-
vidual countries which elevate judgments from the particular country to the
status of a sister state judgment. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation Between the United States of America and The Republic of
Korea, Nov. 7, 1957, U.S.-Korea, 8 U.S.T. 2217; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Greece, Aug. 3, 1957, U.S.-Greece, 5 U.S.T., 1829. These treaties,
under the Supremacy Clause, preempt contrary state law. See Choi v. Kim,
50 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1995) (elevating Korean judgment to status of sister
state); Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104, 106 (11th Cir. 1993)
(elevating Greek judgment to status of sister state).
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quoting the major Supreme Court opinion on the recognition of a
foreign judgment, Hilton v. Guyot,229 a one hundred year old case
involving the recognition of a French judgment. In Hilton, the Su-
preme Court established the basic contours of the common-law
comity approach to recognition of foreign judgments.230 In a five to
four decision, the Supreme Court ultimately refused recognition to
the French judgment because of the lack of reciprocity in that
France would not enforce a similar U.S. judgment. Hilton, by
negative implication, lists the potential defenses to recognition: (1)
lack of a full or fair trial; (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (3)
lack of personal jurisdiction; (4) trial under a system lacking im-
partiality or due process; (5) prejudice in the legal system or court;
229. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
230. Id. at 163-64. The Court announced:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which
the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by
executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be al-
lowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends
upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call "the comity
of nations." Although the phrase has been often criticized, no satis-
factory substitute has been suggested.
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obli-
gation ... nor of mere courtesy and good will .... But it is the rec-
ognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws.
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen
of a foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum
of money adjudged by a court of that country to be due from the de-
fendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign judgment appears to have
been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause
and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and oppor-
tunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to
the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and
formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the
truth of the matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon
the merits tried in a foreign court, unless some special ground is
shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was af-
fected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the principles of interna-
tional law, and by the comity of our own country, it should not be
given full credit and effect.
Id. at 163-64, 205-06; see id. at 202-03.
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
and (6) fraud in procuring the judgment. The only significant de-
viation from Hilton is the subsequent deletion of a requirement for
reciprocity; indeed, the majority of those cases relying on Hilton
fail to discuss any reciprocity requirement.231
The parameters for granting comity to a foreign judgment set
out in Hilton, with the exception of the reciprocity requirement,
continue to dominate our thinking on treatment of foreign judg-
ments in both federal and state courts. Even though the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments within the United States is
largely a matter determined by state law, recognition and en-
forcement is subject to federal constitutional standards that may
serve to invalidate foreign judgments.232 A foreign judgment may
not be recognized or enforced if it violates due process.
Today, there are three basic approaches followed by federal
and state courts, all of which to some extent derive from the tenets
established by Hilton. First, some courts rely strictly on a
common-law approach, derived from Hilton, but usually without
the reciprocity requirement. Others use a statutory approach,
applying the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act.23 3 This Uniform Act, first adopted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1962, has been en-
acted in some version by more than half the states.234 Although its
231. See, e.g., de la Mata v. Am. Life Ins.. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1382-83
(D. Del. 1991), affd without opinion, 961 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1992); Pilkington
Bros. v. AFG Indus., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1043-44 (D. Del. 1984). Both of
these cases are federal courts construing state law.
232. See ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD 1-20 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992); Robert
B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States, 17
VA. J. INT'L LAw 401, 401-403, 408-410 (1977); Robert E. Lutz, Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, Part I: A Selected Bibliography on the United States' En-
forcement of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 27 INT'L LAW. 471 (1993); Robert E.
Lutz, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Part II: A Selected Bibliography of
Enforcement of United States Judgments in Foreign Countries, 27 INT'L LAW.
1029 (1993).
233. UFMJRA, supra note 17.
234. The following states have enacted the UFMJRA: Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washing-
ton. The District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have also adopted it.
Uniform Law Commissioners, UFMJRA, at http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp (last visited Dec. 12,
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direct application is to foreign judgments for money only, states
that have adopted it often look to it for guidance in treating non-
money foreign judgments. 235 The third approach is the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Re-
statement (Third)) which is similar to the earlier Uniform Act, but
covers a broader category of judgments including judgments "es-
tablishing or confirming the status of a person, or determining in-
terests in property."236 Both the Restatement (Third) and the
Uniform Act provide for a foreign judgment meeting certain re-
quirements to be treated like a sister-state judgment entitled to
full faith and credit.237 The absence of a uniform national ap-
2004).
235. See, e.g., Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
236. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, at § 481. The Restatement (Third) in-
corporates many of the Hilton defenses involving fairness, due process, and
jurisdiction, and adds defenses such as conflicting judgments and those con-
trary to an express forum selection agreement, but not a reciprocity require-
ment. Id. at § 482. Of these defenses, there are only two mandatory grounds
for nonrecognition: lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of due process in the
rendering jurisdiction. Id. The six discretionary grounds for nonrecognition
comprise: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of notice; (3) fraud;
(4) public policy of the United States or the forum state; (5) conflicting final
judgments; and (6) a contrary contractual choice of court. Id. Comment h to
section 482 suggests that the contractual choice of court includes selection of
an arbitral tribunal. Id. § 482 cmt. h. For a comparison of the Restatement
(Third) and the Uniform Act, see Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign-
Money Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and Interna-
tional Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 265-80 (1991).
237. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, at § 481 cmt. c; UFMJRA, supra note
17, at § 3. The UFMJRA establishes a presumption of recognition and en-
forcement "in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is en-
titled to full faith and credit." UFMJRA, supra note 17, at § 3. The defenses
to recognition are similar to those of the Restatement (Third), with the bur-
den of proof being placed on the party attempting to avoid recognition. Id.
The Act contains three grounds for mandatory recognition: lack of due proc-
ess, personal jurisdiction, or subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at § 4 (a). The
grounds for discretionary nonrecognition comprise: (1) lack of notice; (2) fraud
in the judgment; (3) public policy; (4) conflicting judgments; (5) a contrary fo-
rum selection clause; and (6) a seriously inconvenient forum. Id. § 4 (b). This
last category is not available under the Restatement (Third). RESTATEMENT,
supra note 25, at § 482 (2). Of the adopting states, some have made all
grounds for nonrecognition mandatory. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114
(1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West 2000). Moreover, eight
adopting states have added a reciprocity requirement, which is discretionary
in seven of those states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605 (West 1994 & Supp.
2004) (discretionary); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114 (1993) (mandatory); IDAHO
CODE § 10-1404 (Michie 2004) (discretionary); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 14, §
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proach to recognition and enforcement of judgments has hampered
parties in securing judgments that will be enforceable abroad. In
addition, the lack of homogeneity makes it difficult to enforce for-
eign judgments here, especially when the enforcing forum requires
reciprocity.
VII. A DECADE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE HAGUE
For the last decade, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law (Hague Conference) 238 has been laboring to cre-
ate a multilateral convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement
of judgments, which of necessity would address parallel litigation
and the potential for inconsistent judgments.23 9 The Hague Con-
ference's undertaking in 1992-93 to work on a general convention
on the recognition and enforcement for foreign judgments was
generated largely by the suggestion of the United States. 240 The
U.S., not a party to any bilateral or multilateral convention on the
enforcement of foreign judgments, sought to find a means for pri-
vate parties to enforce foreign judgments outside of the United
States without relitigation and to "level the playing field" for liti-
gants in the U.S.241 The convention was designed to help the
8505 (West 2003) (discretionary); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West
2000) (mandatory); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1804 (2003) (discretionary); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.92 (West 2004) (discretionary); TEx. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005 (Vernon 1997) (discretionary).
238. The Hague Conference's treaties on aspects of international litigation
such as The Taking of Evidence Abroad, and the Service of Documents
Abroad are well known, as it is pioneering work in the area of family law.
See, e.g., Hague Conference, Convention of the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 1231, available at http://www.hcch.netle/conventions
/index.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2004); Hague Conference, Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-judicial Documents in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, opened for signature November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658
U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force October 7, 1972), available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/index.html. (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
239. See supra note 8. See generally http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index en.php.
240. See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 8, at 1; von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement, supra note 8, at 271; Peter Nygh, Arthur's Baby: The Hague
Negotiations for a World-Wide Judgments Convention, in LAw AND JUSTICE,
supra note 8, at 151, 152.
241. See generally Peter Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in
Negotiating a Worldwide Convention on International Jurisdiction and En-
forcement of Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 263 (John J. Barcelo
2004]
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"middle class litigant,"242 not just the large multinational corpora-
tions who already could afford to resolve their transnational dis-
putes with arbitration. U.S. litigants often found it much harder
to enforce U.S. judgments abroad than the reverse situation for
non-U.S. judgments seeking to be enforced in the United States.
The initial suggestion of the U.S. was a mixed convention, the idea
of Arthur von Mehren,243 where there would be three lists of juris-
dictional bases and the corresponding recognition. 244 The white
grounds were acceptable bases under the convention, black
grounds were unacceptable, and a gray list was where national
law would continue but recognition was not required under the
convention. 245 Many member states who had little trouble having
their judgments recognized and enforced in the United States
viewed the negotiations as a way to cut-back on what they viewed
as exorbitant aspects of U.S. personal jurisdiction, including gen-
eral doing business jurisdiction, activity-based jurisdiction and tag
jurisdiction.
A. The Comprehensive Jurisdiction/Judgments Draft
Much has been written about the history of the negotiations
and the problems that plagued it, from an initial 1999 draft that
was a copy of the Brussels Convention to the 2001 Interim Draft
that was a consensus version with multiple options and 201 foot-
notes.246 Many of the obstacles to the conclusion of a comprehen-
sive jurisdiction and judgments convention to which the United
States would be a party were not apparent at the beginning of the
& Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002).
242. Peter Trooboff, a member of the U.S. delegation, frequently used this
expression in advocating for a comprehensive judgments convention. See id.
at 263.
243. See generally von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad, supra note
8.
244. See id. at 283-84.
245. See id.
246. The 2001 draft text of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, an interim text, was drawn up
at Part One of the Nineteenth Diplomatic Session, which was held from 6-22
June 2001. Hague Conference, Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in
Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference, June 6-22,
2001 (prepared by the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters), available at
http://www.hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/j dgm200ldraft-e.pdf. (last visited
Dec. 12, 2004).
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decade when negotiations began but arose much later, including
the rise of the internet and electronic commerce, the role of the
consumer and the increased integration of the European Commu-
nity.247 The documents of the Hague Conference itself point out
many of the problems.
Part of the problem at the Hague Conference is similar to that
currently occurring within the European Union with its attempts
to accommodate both civil and common-law traditions. But unlike
the European Union, the Hague Conference has no ECJ or its
equivalent to settle disputes or harmonize interpretations, nor is
there a common trade goal. While this lack of shared values or
goals among the Hague Conference members has made drafting a
treaty difficult, one of the best examples of the blending of legal
traditions is the crafting of Articles 21 and 22, those dealing with
lis pendens and forum non conveniens. The common law tradition
allows discretion to decline jurisdiction, in contrast to the civil law
tradition. This same difficulty in melding the two systems, as
mentioned earlier, is illustrated by the current litigation within
the European Community involving whether the discretionary
doctrines of forum non conveniens and antisuit injunctions survive
the Brussels Regulation with its strict lis pendens and defined
grounds for jurisdiction.248
The Hague delegates managed to reach a compromise be-
tween the civil and common law traditions, evidenced by the bal-
ance achieved in the complementary articles concerning lis
247. Following the June 2001 diplomatic session, there were informal
meetings among different member nations exploring ways to continue the
work on the Judgments Convention. For a discussion of the state of the nego-
tiations, see Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 16, supra note 22.
Two other documents on the Hague Conference website, both produced
by Avril D. Haines, provide insight into the problems the Conference has
faced, especially in connection with the internet and also the problems re-
lated to choice of court agreements. See Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 17, su-
pra note 22.; Hague Conference, Choice of Court Agreements in International
Litigation: Their Use and Legal Problems to Which They Give Rise in the Con-
text of the Interim Text, Prel. Doc. No. 18 (Feb. 2002) (prepared by Avril D.
Haines) [hereinafter Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 18], available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/workprogjdgm.html (last visited October 7, 2004); see
also Fausto Pocar, The Drafting of a World-Wide Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments: Which Format for the Negotiations in The
Hague?, in LAw AND JUSTICE, supra note 8.
248. See discussion supra Part VI.
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pendens and forum non conveniens. The 2001 Interim Draft pro-
vides for a lis pendens based on first filed or "seised," but allowing
the potential for declining jurisdiction in favor of a "clearly more
appropriate forum." Thus the objectionable aspect of the Brussels
Convention/Regulation of creating a race to file is tempered by
considerations of appropriateness and convenience. Similarly, the
potential for broad discretionary declining of jurisdiction is limited
to a specific time period and specific elements of convenience, but
also tied to the potential for subsequent enforcement. 249
B. The Choice of Court Convention
After a stalemate in 2001 in connection with producing a
comprehensive jurisdiction and judgments convention to which
the U.S. would be a party, some country members of the Hague
Conference called for a scaled-back convention that might provide
limited relief while not addressing some of the controversial areas
involving consumers, electronic commerce, and intellectual prop-
erty. Beginning in October 2002, an Informal Working Group met
to attempt to draft a less inclusive convention, ultimately coming
up with a draft of a choice of court agreements convention after
three meetings. The hope was to produce a choice of court/forum
249. For a discussion of forum non conveniens and the balance with lis
pendens, especially in relation to the Hague Convention 1999 and 2001
drafts, see Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 467(2002). Professor Brand has been a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Hague Conference for the Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, and has
noted:
The common elements of forum non conveniens doctrine throughout
the common law world have been incorporated into the rules found
in Article 22 of the Interim Text of a Hague Convention on jurisdic-
tion and foreign judgments .... At the same time, this provision is
balanced against the lis pendens rules found in Article 21. The com-
bination integrates elements of predictability found in the civil law
lis pendens approach with the search for equitable results that un-
derlies the common law forum non conveniens doctrine.... Articles
21 and 22 of the Interim Text provide a constructive focus for com-
parative analysis and set the stage for progress in the world of paral-
lel litigation.
Id. at 495. See also Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the
Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP.
L. 203 (2001).
BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN
convention 25 0 that would enforce forum selection clauses and re-
sulting judgments, much as the New York Convention does with
arbitration clauses and subsequent arbitral awards. Although only
a small piece of the puzzle of a judgments convention, a large por-
tion of multiple proceedings is generated by actions contrary to fo-
rum selection clauses or actions to enforce forum selection clauses.
A choice of court convention could have a positive impact not only
on dispute resolution but also on transactional planning, provid-
ing enforcement for exclusive choice of court clauses as well as for
the resulting judgments.
In a survey of practitioners conducted by the ABA Section of
International Litigation and Practice in October-November 2003,
over 98% of those responding indicated that a convention on choice
of court agreements would be useful for their practice. Over 70%
indicated that a convention would make them "more willing to
designate litigation instead of arbitration" in their contracts.25'
The Hague Conference on Private International Law has
since produced a significant draft of an Exclusive Choice of Court
Agreements Convention. A full Special Commission was held in
December 2003, and a second one in April 2004, from which
emerged the most recent draft, Working Document No. 110 E (Re-
vised), available at the Hague Conference's website. 252 Although
the earlier drafts had called for jurisdiction and a lis pendens for
exclusive choice of court clauses, they also provided for recognition
and enforcement of non-exclusive clauses as well. The current
draft addresses only exclusive choice of court clauses in interna-
tional cases, as defined in Article 1(2).253 The draft convention
250. See Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 16, supra note 22, at n.4.
251. The survey is a product of the ABA Working Group on the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which is co-chaired by Louise
Ellen Teitz and Janis H. Brennan, a partner at Foley, Hoag LLP in Washing-
ton, D.C. Douglas Earl McLaren at Bechtel SAIC Company LLC also helped
to develop the survey. Help was also provided by the D.C. Bar Association
and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The survey was based
on the draft text prior to the December 2003 Special Commission which pro-
vided some coverage for non-exclusive choice of court agreements.
252. Hague Conference, Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Work. Doc. No. 110 E (Revised) (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter Working Doc. No.
110 E (Revised)], available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.htmL
(last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
253. Id. at art. 1.
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would enforce exclusive forum selection clauses under Article 5
unless the agreement is "null and void" under the law of the cho-
sen court. A nonchosen, or derogated court, under Article 7 would
be required to suspend or dismiss its proceedings unless the
agreement was null and void under the law of the chosen court,
there was a lack of capacity under the law of the court seised, or
"giving effect to the agreement would lead to a very serious injus-
tice or would be manifestly contrary to fundamental principles of
public policy."254 The April 2004 draft flags several policy issues
that need further clarification.255 The United States had hoped to
use language parallel to the New York Convention but the ground
of "very serious injustice" is similar to the current Supreme Court
standard for substantive invalidity of "unreasonable or unjust" in
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 256
Other policy decisions are becoming more divisive in connec-
tion with the recognition and enforcement provisions and poten-
tial reasons for non-enforcement. Recognition and enforcement of
254. Id. at art. 7:
Article 7 Obligations of a court not chosen
If the parties have entered into an exclusive choice of court agree-
ment, any court in a Contracting State other than that of the chosen
court shall suspend or dismiss the proceedings unless -
a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the
chosen court;
b) a party lacked the capacity to enter into the agreement under the
law of the State
of the court seised;
c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a very serious injus-
tice or would be manifestly contrary to fundamental principles of
public policy of the State of the court seised;
d) for exceptional reasons, the agreement cannot reasonably be per-
formed; or
e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case[, except where it
has transferred the case to another court of the same State as per-
mitted by Article 5, paragraph 3 b)].
Id. (citations omitted).
255. See Id. at art. 7 nn.3-6; see also Hague Conference, Draft Report, Pre-
liminary Document No. 26, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice
of Court Agreements, Prel. Doc. No. 26, at %% 54-55 (Dec. 2004) (prepared by
Masato Dogauchi & Trevor C. Hartley), [hereinafter Prelim. Doc. No. 26],
available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/jdgm-pd26e.pdf (last visited
December 7, 2004).
256. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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a judgment that results from an exclusive choice of court clause
designating a member state may be refused generally only if the
agreement is null and void, the party lacked capacity, the defen-
dant did not have sufficient notice, the judgment was obtained by
fraud, the recognition would be "manifestly incompatible" with
public policy, or the judgment is inconsistent with another judg-
ment.257 Thus, there is the opportunity for review of the validity of
257. Working Doc. No. 110 E (Revised), supra note 252, at art. 9.
Article 9 Recognition and enforcement
1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in
an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognized and en-
forced in other Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter.
Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the following
grounds -
a) the agreement was null and void under the law of the State of the
chosen court, unless the chosen court has determined that the
agreement is valid;
b) a party lacked the capacity to enter into the agreement under the
law of the requested State;
c) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent
document, including the essential elements of the claim,
i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a
way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defen-
dant entered an appearance and presented his case without contest-
ing notification in the court of origin, provided that the law of the
State of origin permitted notification to be contested, or
ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a manner
that violated the public policy of that State;
d) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter
of procedure;
e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with
the public policy of the requested State, including situations where
the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible
with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State; or
f) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in a dispute
between the same parties in the requested State, or it is inconsistent
with an earlier judgment given in another State between the same
parties and involving the same cause of action, provided that the
earlier judgment fulfils-the conditions necessary for its recognition in
the requested State[under an international agreement], and pro-
vided that the inconsistent judgment was not given in contravention
of this Convention.
[1 bis. Paragraph 1 shall also apply to a judgment given by a court of
a Contracting State pursuant to a transfer of the case from the cho-
sen court in that Contracting State as permitted by Article 5, para-
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the exclusive forum selection clause three times: by the chosen
court when it takes jurisdiction, by the non-chosen court when it
must suspend or dismiss proceedings contrary to the exclusive fo-
rum selection agreement, and by the enforcing court at the time of
recognition and enforcement of the judgment. The draft now indi-
cates that the determination of validity is to be made under the
law of the court chosen, but the non-chosen court and the enforc-
ing court still have the possibility in rare cases to apply their pub-
lic policy.
One addition in the December 2003 Special Commission was a
damage provision that, contrary to the U.S. position, would allow
a reduction in certain cases not only for awards of non-
compensatory damages or punitive damages, but also for compen-
satory damages that are "grossly excessive." 258 The "grossly exces-
sive language," added near the end of the Special Commission,
follows language that was in the 2001 draft. However, in the con-
text of a comprehensive judgments convention covering tort ac-
tions, this provision was a compromise of interests. In the smaller
contractual choice of court convention, the provision makes no
sense when parties have contractually chosen the forum to hear
their dispute. Indeed, the addition of Article 10(2)(a) (now Article
15), initiated by Canada, makes the convention less attractive for
businesses who might again favor arbitration since there is no
similar provision for reduction of awards under the New York
Convention and there is the possibility in some cases for punitive
noncompensatory damages to be upheld in full. The potential re-
view and recognition is continued in the April 2004 draft, now as
Article 15. In addition, the April 2004 draft includes several cate-
gories of exclusions: asbestos related matters added by Canada, 259
and natural resources and joint ventures items added by China. 260
Brackets and footnotes, currently up to Number 18, have crept
graph 3 b).]
Id. (citations omitted).
258. Hague Conference, Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Work. Doc. No. 49 E (Revised), art. 10 (Dec. 2003) (copy on file with author).
Note that as a result of several additions and revisions to this December 2003
draft, Article 10 has been renumbered as Article 15. Working Doc. No. 110 E
(Revised), supra note 252, at art. 15.
259. Working Document No. 110 E (Revised), supra note 252, at art. 20.
260. Id. at art. 20 n.15.
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into the newest draft, especially in connection with issues related
to intellectual property. The simple, short initial draft, modeled on
the New York Convention, is becoming more complex with more
special interests added and more areas where consensus is lack-
ing. Thus the attempt to parallel the New York Convention has
been sabotaged.
Nonprofit organizations continue to voice concerns with the
non-negotiated contracts and their potential inclusion in the con-
vention when commercial, a problem that ultimately reflects dis-
satisfaction with the underlying substantive contract law that
validates contract formation in these circumstances. The current
draft of the convention does not include an independent standard
of substantive validity but incorporates a choice of law of the cho-
sen court.
The final diplomatic conference, tentatively scheduled for
June 2005, will need to address several unresolved issues. There
are still several areas to be worked out or refined including: scope;
coverage of intellectual property and the "incidental question"; re-
lationship to other regional conventions (particularly the Euro-
pean Union), or what is called "disconnection"261; relationship of lis
pendens and stays to actions and judgments from courts of con-
tracting and noncontracting states; bases for refusal to recognize
choice of court agreements and judgments; and the treatment of
damage awards. There is also the question of how the convention
should handle wholly domestic transactions for purposes of both
jurisdiction and enforcement, and what constitutes "wholly do-
mestic." For example, do we want a judgment resulting from a
contract between a New York buyer and California seller, with a
California choice of court, to be enforced under the convention
should the buyer manage to move all of its assets out of the United
States? Of course, the problem will be that the buyer would move
all the assets not to another contracting country, but to some off-
shore noncontracting country.
The convention would enforce forum selection clauses and re-
sulting judgments, much as the New York Convention does with
arbitration clauses and subsequent arbitral awards. The conven-
tion has the potential to offer increased certainty and subsequent
261. For a discussion of some of these issues of disconnection, see Hague
Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 24, supra note 22.
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enforceability for consensual commercial transactions. From the
standpoint of parallel proceedings, the draft convention, or one
similar, offers the possibility of reducing a significant amount of
parallel litigation through the enforcing "stick" of a modified lis
pendens provided in Article 7, and the "carrot" of enforcement in
Article 9, if not contrary to an exclusive choice of court clause. Re-
ducing the friction generated from these cases discussed above
would go a long way to reduce the number and need for parallel
litigation and to provide predictability in planning transactions.262
C. The American Law Institute and Other Efforts
The American Law Institute (ALI) has undertaken a project
to federalize the enforcement of judgments with a proposed stat-
ute containing a modified lis pendens provision, tied to subsequent
enforceability of a judgment. The International Jurisdiction and
Judgments Project was begun originally to produce implementing
legislation for a Hague Conference comprehensive jurisdiction and
judgments convention, but as the Hague project stalled, the ALI's
work has continued forward as a proposed federal statute, The
Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act (FJREA).263
Section 11 of the draft, "Declination of Jurisdiction When
Prior Action is Pending," adopts a basic lis pendens principle that
presumes the first-filed matter, either here or abroad, should pro-
ceed, if that judgment would be entitled to recognition under the
FJREA, which includes a reciprocity provision under Section 7. 26
The U.S. court would stay or dismiss the second-filed U.S. action,
unless the foreign action was based on jurisdictional grounds not
262. There is still considerable work to be done on the problem of chosen
and nonchosen courts in the 2004 Draft. See Prelim. Doc. No. 26, supra note
255, at 146-52, 172-76.
263. See INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note
9.
264. See id. at §§ 7, 11. A reciprocity requirement has been controversial.
Scholars have criticized this reciprocity requirement that was included in
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nation-
alizing International Law: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 121, 128 (1997) ("The Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot was
wrong in insisting on reciprocity."); Richard H.M. Maloy & Desamparados M.
Nisi, A Message to the Supreme Court: The Next Time You Get a Chance,
Please Look at Hilton v. Guyot; We Think It Needs Repairing, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court should reject reciprocity
for enforcing foreign judgments).
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recognized under the FJREA or was subject to certain defenses.
These defenses generally follow those enumerated in the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 265 and in Hilton v.
Guyot.266
Section 11 also provides grounds for a court to decline to defer
to another first-filed foreign action. A U.S. court could decide not
to defer to a foreign action although first-filed where: (1) the U.S.
forum was the "more appropriate forum"; (2) the foreign action
was vexatious or frivolous; or (3) for "other compelling reasons."
Section 11 works in tandem with the nonrecogntion provisions by
providing for discretionary nonrecognition of a foreign judgment
when a prior action is pending in the United States. Article 11 is
designed "to create an incentive for a foreign court to decline ju-
risdiction in favor of a prior U.S. proceeding."267 In addition, Sec-
tion 5 also provides for discretionary nonrecognition of antisuit
injunctions. Thus the ALI proposed statute would bring coherence
to this area of jurisprudence and provide a rule that encouraged
suit in the most appropriate forum by offering a lis pendens. 268
This lis pendens would also encourage parties to avoid vexatious
litigation or litigation filed to frustrate suit in the most appropri-
ate forum by allowing a court to refuse to enforce a foreign judg-
ment obtained in a later filed foreign action, or one that was
designed to preempt litigation in the more appropriate U.S. forum,
such as through an antisuit injunction or negative declaration. 269
265. UFMJRA, supra note 17.
266. 159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895). See discussion supra Part VI.
267. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 9
at § 11 cmt. k.
268. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Anti-suit Injunctions,
Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 314, 319-20 (1997).
269. The ALI Statute builds on and perfects concepts like those in the the
International Law Association's project covering both forum non conveniens
and parallel proceedings. See generally INT'L LAW ASS'N, LEUVEN/LONDON
PRINCIPLES ON DECLINING AND REFERRING JURISDICTION IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS (2000), at http://www.ilahq.org.; CONFLICT OF
JURISDICTION MODEL ACT (1987), reprinted in Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites,
supra note 6. The International Law Association project covers both forum
non conveniens and parallel proceedings. Efforts to harmonize approaches to
parallel proceedings from a procedural standpoint could lead to a more con-
sistent and predictable, as well as less abrasive, method of handling parallel
proceedings and reduce the costs to parties and judicial systems. See Stephen
B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration: The Proposed Hague Convention
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Differences in approach to parallel litigation as well as differ-
ences in jurisdiction "are a permanent source of conflict between
the courts of different nations and often hinder the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments."270 The ALI Judgments
Project is a concrete means to reduce multiple proceedings, en-
couraging parties to sue once and in the most appropriate forum
by both offering the carrot of a lis pendens and using the stick of
denial of recognition of a judgment resulting from a violation. In-
deed, as with the Hague Conference judgments projects, the ALI
project as well recognizes the need to address parallel litigation
and inappropriate forum in any coherent effort to codify recogni-
tion and enforcement.271
VIII. CONCLUSION
Global forum shopping with parallel proceedings has become
a worldwide problem, requiring more than unilateral actions. The
last decade has shown the increasing need for a consistent
jurisprudence in the United States and elsewhere to deal with
multiple proceedings, antisuit injunctions and deference to other
courts. The work at the Hague on a Choice of Court Convention
and the ALI International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project
with an explicit lis pendens reflect attempts to address aspects of
multiple proceedings. These varied and multiple approaches to
transnational litigation offer the promise of harmonization in
several areas, and thus hope for the attendant reduction in the
amount of concurrent litigation and friction it generates. The
global efforts on many fronts to harmonize approaches to parallel
proceedings from a procedural standpoint could lead to a more
consistent and predictable, as well as less abrasive, method of
handling parallel proceedings, and help reduce the costs to parties
and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. LAW 203, 204 (2001).
270. Rolf Stfirner, Some European Remarks on a New Joint Project of the
American Law Institute and UNIDROIT, 34 INT'L LAw. 1071, 1073 (2000)
(discussing the ALTIUNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil
Procedure.)
271. The European Commission, in conjunction with the Brussels Regula-
tion, has focused more on the issues of judicial cooperation within the Com-
munity and with third countries. The integration of European law with the
common-law and civil law origins also has an impact on the continued exis-
tence of parallel proceedings and antisuit injunctions when one or more of the
litigants is a member state.
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and to judicial systems. Unfortunately, in the United States there
is a continuing attempt to squeeze the parallel proceedings prob-
lem into the shoes of domestic doctrines, shoes that are both too
small and too old to fit the larger needs of transnational dispute
resolution.

